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THE NEW YORK STATE
CONSTITUTION AND
AID TO CHURCHRELATED SCHOOLS
CHARLES E. RICE *

Some Historical Antecedents of the Convention of 1894

F ROM

ITS EARLIEST days the church and school were closely united

in Dutch New Netherland. The elementary school of that colony
has been well described as a "public parochial school" that never
failed to teach the catechism.'
The main purpose of such education
was to train children in the principles of the Dutch Reformed
religion.
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The English captured New Amsterdam in August, 1664, the Dutch
retook it for a year in 1673, and the English made their conquest
permanent in 1674. During their interregnum of 1673 the Dutch
attempted to re-establish the Reformed religion in the schools and
elsewhere.- Significantly, when the English achieved complete control in 1674, they adopted an attitude similar to the Dutch in
relation to the religious character of the public schools. The English
permitted the Dutch religious schools to endure throughout the entire
colonial era, and the Charter granted by William It to the Dutch Reformed Church in 1696 solidified that Church's control over the Dutch
schools, with the schoolmaster and other officials to be nominated
by the "Ministers with the consent of the Elders and deacons
of the said Church. 1
The English schools in the colony of
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New York were similarly church-controlled
from their inception. After 1685, English school teachers in the colony were
required to be licensed by the Bishop of
London 5 After 1701, English education
in New York was under the principal direction of the Society for the Propagation
of the Gospel in Foreign parts, which was
an evangelical arm of the Anglican
Church. English schoolmasters were enjoined by a Standing Order of the Society
[to] consider the end for which they are
employed, viz., the instructing and disposing children to believe and live as
Christians. In order to this end, that
they teach them to read truly and distinctly that they may be capable of reading the Holy Scriptures and other pious
and useful books, for informing their
understanding and regulating their manners. That they instruct them thoroughly
in the Church catechism; teach them first
to read it distinctly and exactly, then to
learn it perfectly by heart, endeavoring to
make them understand the sense and
meaning of it by the help of such expositions as the society shall send over. 6
The religious control of public education
in New York persisted through the colonial
period. With the coming of Independence, however, there began a withdrawal
of public education from church control.
But this withdrawal was a gradual process.
The New York State Constitution of 1777
ended the official establishment of the
Church of England and provided for the
free toleration of religious profession and
worship by all persons. This guarantee

of religious toleration, incidentally, was a
departure from the colonial practice and
rule which, since 1691, had excepted "Papists" from the guarantee of liberty of
conscience. Interestingly, the convention
which framed the Constitution of 1777
rejected by a vote of nineteen to ten, after
it was "debated at length," a proposed
amendment by John Jay which would
have required "the professors of the
religion of the Church of Rome" to swear
that the Church authorities could neither
absolve them from their allegiance to the
7
state nor absolve men from sin.
In 1782, Governor George Clinton
urged the establishment of a system of
public education. The Act of May 18,
1784, establishing the University of the
State of New York, authorized the clergy
of each religious denomination to choose
one of their number as a Regent of the
University. Each religious society also
had the right, upon making a minimum
yearly donation of not less than 200
bushels of wheat, "to institute a professorship in the said university for the promotion of their particular religious tenets." 8 Another act in 1784 permitted
religious societies to incorporate, with the
right to own real estate, to build schools
and churches and otherwise to conduct
their usual affairs.8 That the churches
readily availed themselves of the powers.
conferred by this law can be seen from the
large number of religious schools which
existed in New York City in the early
nineteenth -century. 10
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The Regents of the University urged the
establishment of a system of public education in 1793, 1794, and 1795.11 Finally, in 1795, the legislature enacted "An
Act for the Encouragement of Schools,"
which appropriated twenty thousand
pounds for the support of elementary
schools, including "the several charity
schools."'1
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Many of the existing schools

in New York City were such church-related "Charity Schools." 13 It is in no
way surprising that the public appropriations for education were then channeled
as well to church-related schools. The
policy of appropriating public lands for
the support of the gospel and of church
schools had been initiated by the legislature in 1781,14 and was continued by

succeeding legislatures. 15
The Act of 1795, with its support of
religiously-conducted schools, expired by
its terms in 1800. Private and religious
schools received no further public sustenance until 1805 when the legislature,
responding to Governor Morgan Lewis'
plea that "Religion and morality cannot
be too sedulously inculcated," 16 provided

for the sale of state-owned lands and the
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establishment with the proceeds of a
permanent fund for the support of common schools.
It was not until 1812 that the legislature
enacted a comprehensive and permanent
system of common schools. The 1812
Act was cast in a spirit of hospitality
toward religion and religious schools. It
prescribed moral qualifications for teachers, urged Bible reading in the schools and
premised the enactment upon the judgment that common schools "appear to be
the best plan that can be devised to disseminate religion, morality and training
through a whole country." 17 When, in
1813, the legislature applied the provisions of the general 1812 Act to New
York City, church-related schools in that
city were specifically included in the distribution of the public funds.' s This cooperative arrangement, however, did not
long endure. A conflict soon developed
between the nonsectarian Free School Society and various religious societies over
the issue of whether public funds should
be channeled to the nonsectarian schools
alone or also the church-related schools.
In 1824, the legislature left the decision of
the question up to the Common Council
of the City of New York, where the controversy was most intense. After heated
debate the issue was resolved by the enactment of an ordinance in New York
City in 1825 depriving all church-related
schools of any share in the public funds.
A major role in causing this change in legislative attitude may be attributed to the
militant Free School Society, which changed

"7N.Y. Sess. Laws 1812, ch. 242; see CONNORS,
op. cit supra note 2, at xvi.
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its name to the Public School Society in
1826 '9 and which dominated the making
of educational policy in New York City
2 0
through 1840.
In the fifteen years following the Ordinance of 1825, only two religious institutions were permitted to share in the
common school fund in New York City.
The Protestant Orphan Asylum was included in the fund in 1825 and the Roman
Catholic Orphan Asylum was included in
1832. But these exceptions were premised
upon the nonsectarian character of the
Protestant Orphan Asylum and the singular public benefit arising from the services which the Catholic asylum rendered
exclusively to orphans. That the exceptions did not extend to church-related
schools in general and were not based
upon a relaxation of the exclusionary
Ordinance of 1825 can be seen from the
fact that a similar petition by the Methodist Episcopal Charity school was decisively rejected by the Board of Aldermen
in 1832 after more than a year of public
21
debate and agitation.
The decade of the 1830's was marked
in New York City by continuing conflict
over the place of religion in public schools.
Bishop John Dubois, the Roman Catholic
Bishop of New York, sought unsuccessfully
in 1834 to induce the Public School Society
to eliminate certain sectarian features hostile to Catholicism from the school program, to permit Catholic children to
receive catechism instruction in the schools
after regular class hours and generally to
achieve a more harmonious cooperation

19N.Y. Sess. Laws 1826, ch. 25.
20 CONNORS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15.
21 Id. at 10.

between the Catholic Church and the
public schools. 22 In 1838, the committee
on colleges, academies, and common
schools of the state assembly rejected a
petition for the enactment of a law prohibiting all religious exercises in public
schools; the petition was based on the
ground, among others, that "the Christian
religion is thus supported or aided at the
public expense." '2' Throughout the 1830's,
the public controversy was characterized
by an increasingly anti-Catholic tenor, born
principally of the fear that rising Catholic
immigration portended a papal intrusion
into the political life of America. Indeed,
the anti-Catholic "Nativist" influence was
so strong that in 1837 the mayor and the
entire Common Council of New York City
were elected by the New York Native
4
Americans.2
The religious controversy over the public schools came to a head in the 1840's.
Governor William H. Seward, in his annual message to the state legislature on
January 7, 1840, urged the public establishment and support of denominational
schools. 25 In the wake of the Governor's
recommendation,
the seven Catholic
schools in New York City petitioned the
Common Council for a share of the state
education funds. After a year of vigorous
debate, the Common Council rejected the
Catholic claims by a vote of fifteen to
one. 2 Having failed, thus far, to secure
public funds for Catholic schools, Bishop
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John Hughes took the matter to the state
legislature in an effort to lessen the sectarian and anti-Catholic atmosphere in the
public schools and to obtain more equitable public treatment for Catholic
schools.2 7 In 1842, the legislature, acting
largely upon the recommendation of
Governor Seward, enacted the Maclay Act,
which terminated the monopoly of the
Public School Society over the public
schools in New York City. The act generally extended to New York City the
common school system then in use upstate, and provided for the popular election, in the wards of New York City, of
public school commissioners, inspectors
and trustees. Under the act, some churchrelated schools were specifically made district schools, subject to the jurisdiction of
the board of education and entitled to
share in public school money. The act
went on, however, to provide that no
school "in which any religious sectarian
doctrine or tenet shall be taught, inculcated or practised, shall receive any portion of the school moneys. . ... 's The
legislature reinforced the mandate of this
last provision by providing in 1844 that
no school shall be entitled to a portion
of the school moneys in which the religious sectarian doctrine or tenet of any
particular Christian, or other religious sect
shall be taught, inculcated or practised,
or in which any book or books containing
compositions favorable or prejudicial to
the particular doctrine or tenets of any
Christian sect, or which shall teach the
doctrine or tenets of any other religious
sect, or which shall refuse or [sic] permit
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the visits and examinations provided for in
29
this act.
The Act of 1842 dealt only with the
schools of New York City, and although
its prohibition against public support of
schools teaching sectarian tenets was, in
effect, retained in the subsequent enactments of 1844,30 1851,31 and 1882,32
no similar statutory provision has ever
been enacted to apply generally to the
state as a whole. 33 This particular statute,
outlawing sectarianism in the schools of
New York City only, was on the statute
books when the Constitutional Conventions of 1846, 1867, and 1894 took place.
Incidentally, it was remarked in the debates at the 1894 Convention that in all
cases where non-public schools in New
York City had received public money, the
law prohibiting sectarian instruction and
the use of sectarian textbooks had been
observed.3 4 Subsequently, the prohibition
was incorporated into the New York City
Charters of 1897 and 1901, but it was
not included in the 1938 New York City
Charter. 35 It is useful to note that the
original 1842 enactment was born of an
effort to remove sectarianism from the
public schools. However, it also reflected
a climate of partial accommodation between the legislature and church-related
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1844, ch. 320, § 12.
30 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1844, ch. 320.
"1N.Y. Sess. Laws 1851, ch. 386, § 18.
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schools. This accommodation, however,
was something less than all-embracing. In
1853, the assembly committee on colleges,
academies, and common schools unanimously rejected a petition by Catholic
citizens for a direct allotment of common
36
school funds to church-related schools.
But the legislators' disinclination to aid
religious schools directly was not strong
enough to impel them to enact that disinclination into a mandatory statute. Thus,
in 1854, the assembly did not pass a bill
which would have specifically deprived
denominational schools as such of any
share in the public fund. 37 The 1842
act, excluding public aid to schools which
included sectarian teachings or exercises,
had no application outside of New York
City. And in the three decades following
1842, there were examples of limited public support accorded to church schools.
For example, commencing in 1847,38 a
series of enactments provided for grants
by the state from the United States Deposit Fund to schools in orphan asylums.
Many of these schools were denominational and, although they received public
moneys and were subject to supervision
by public educational officers, they retained their autonomy as to the instruction they offered.3 9 Similar laws were
4 0
1862,41 and 1869,42
enacted in 1850,
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to apply to private institutions other than
orphan asylums. In the late 1860's, the
legislature made several modest appropriations directly to some parochial schools
in New York City.4 3 Then, in 1871, the
legislature aided some Catholic schools in
New York City which were exempted as
"charitable institutions" from the prohibition against appropriations to "any institution or enterprise that is under the
control of any religious denomination,"
contained in another 1871 act relating to
local government in New York City.44
Controversies over state support of sectarian academies developed similarly to
those concerning elementary schools. The
academy issue came to a climax between
1865 and 1873 and culminated in a restriction in the Appropriation Act of 1873,
that "no part of this fund shall be distributed in aid of any religious or denominational academy of this state." .45 Another act passed the same day "in relation
to academies and academical departments
of union schools," provided that "no
money shall be paid to any school under
the control of any religious or denominational sect or society. "46
After 1875, academies declined in importance and were superseded by high
schools and academic departments of
union schools. Many of these were under
church control and they did receive some
public funds until the adoption of the Constitution of 1894.7

93

(Cath. Univ. of America, Educational Research
Monographs 1951).
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In the 1850's, numerous appropriations were made to denominational colleges and there was no significant controversy engendered thereby. With the
exception of St. John's (now Fordham),
the aided colleges were not under Catholic
auspices. After 1859, the legislature provided only minimal and occasional aid to
4
denominational colleges .
The center stage of the controversy over
state support of religious bodies was held,
throughout the century, by the elementary
school. From the 1860's onward, the
mood and tempo of public debate and
opinion grew increasingly strident and
The advocates of the public
bitter.
schools feared a Catholic plot to destroy
those schools and Catholics, continuing
their resistance to compulsive sectarianism
in those schools, condemned them regularly as Godless.49 There were, it is
true, serious efforts made to compromise
the dispute, notably under the so-called
Poughkeepsie Plan, which included a limited incorporation of parochial schools into
the publicly-financed school system." Ultimately, such a compromise plan in Niagara County was ruled illegal in 1886
by the acting state superintendent of common schools because under it three nuns
were retained as public school teachers. 51
In 1887, the state superintendent similarly
ruled that the employment in public
schools of nuns wearing religious garb

0 Id. at 104-05.
49 The tenor of the period, including the sharp
differences of opinion among the Catholic clergy,
is well summarized in CONNORS, op. cit. supra
note 36, at 105-07.
50See id. at 110.
-"Id.at 117.
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constituted unfair discrimination in favor
2
of Catholics.5
Apart from the few local efforts to
achieve a compromise between the parochial and public school systems, during
the last third of the nineteenth century
there was increasing bitterness over the
issue of religion in public education. Nor
was this bitterness a New York phenomenon. On the contrary, it was reflected
nationally in the career of the Blaine
Amendment. In 1875, President Ulysses
S. Grant delivered an address to the Army
of the Tennessee in which he cautioned
against public support of sectarian
schools.53 In his annual message to Congress that year, President Grant called for
a constitutional amendment requiring the
states to maintain public schools and forbidding the teaching in them of religious,
atheistic or pagan tenets.5 4 In line with
his request, the Blaine Amendment was
introduced in the House of Representatives
in 1875. 5 The amendment passed the
House of Representatives by a two-thirds
majority.56 As introduced in the House
it read:
No State shall make any law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money
raised by taxation in any State for the
support of public schools, or derived from
any public fund therefor, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under
the control of any religious sect, nor shall
any money so raised or lands so devoted

52
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religious sects or

The amendment was rewritten by the
Senate Judiciary Committee and, as debated in the Senate, it read as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no religious
test shall ever be required as a qualification
to any office or public trust under any
State. No public property and no public
revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or
under the authority of, the United States,
or any State, Territory, District, or municipal corporation, shall be appropriated
to or made or used for the support of
any school, educational or other institution
under the control of any religious or antireligious sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein the particular creed or
tenets of any religious or anti-religious
sect, organization, or denomination shall
be taught. And no such particular creed
or tenets shall be read or taught in any
school or institution supported in whole
or in part by such revenue or loan of
credit, and no such appropriation or loan
of credit shall be made to any religious
or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or to promote its interests or
tenets. This article shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible
in any school or institution; and it shall
not have the effect to impair rights or
property already vested.
Sec. 2. Congress shall have power, by
appropriate legislation, to provide for the
prevention and punishment of violations
of this article. 58

ators were influenced by their belief that
state constitutions already dealt adequately
with the problem to which the proposed
amendment addressed itself. 60 The Blaine
Amendment was incorporated in the Republican Party's national platform of 1876
and, for a time, it was a burning political
issue. The impact of the issue, and the
general frame of public mind during the
last quarter of the nineteenth century and
the first years of the twentieth, is indicated
by the widespread incorporation of similar
provisions by 29 states into their own constitutions between 1877 and 1917.61

62

states.

The Convention of 1894
The climax of New York State's long
nineteenth century contention over religion
and public education was the adoption of

the 1894 Constitution. In the Constitutional Conventions of 1821 and 1846,
there was no mention of state aid to denominational schools.6 " In the 1867 Convention, a petition was presented by a
group of citizens "in favor of the prohibition of donations of public moneys to
60 See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM

131 (1953).

The Blaine Amendment was defeated
in the Senate by a vote determined largely
by partisanship 51 and in which some sen-

The

Blaine Amendment itself was introduced
in Congress twenty times between 1876
and 1929, but it never received the requisite two-thirds majorities and thus was
never referred for ratification to the

See also concurring opinion of Mr.

Justice Frankfurter in McCollum v. Board of'
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 218-19 (1948).
61
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616 COMMITTEE REPORT 257 (1938).
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sectarian institutions," but it was apparently ignored and, beyond a statement
of sentiment as to religious freedom in the
course of a debate on another subject and
an argument against giving public funds
to higher institutions of learning because
they were sectarian, nothing was said in
64
the Convention on the subject.
Prior to and during the 1894 Convention, many petitions were submitted to
it in behalf of a constitutional amendment
to bar public aid to sectarian schools. Several such amendments were introduced,
generally designed to "prohibit all sectarian appropriations." 65 The Committee
on Education recommended the following
section:
Neither the State nor any subdivision
thereof shall use its property or credit
or any public money, or authorize or
permit either to be used, directly or
indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other
than for examination or inspection, of any
school or institution of learning wholly
or in part under the control or direction
of any religious denomination, or in which
any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught.
This Section shall not apply to schools in
institutions subject to visitation and in66
spection of the State Board of Charities.
The Committee filed a report with its
recommendation and stated that:
The first sentence of the last section of
the proposed article needs no explanation
or defense. In the opinion of the committee there is no demand from the people

64
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of the State upon this Convention so unmistakable, widespread and urgent; none,
moreover, so well grounded in right and
reason, as that the public-school system
of the State shall be forever protected
by constitutional safeguards from all sectarian influence or interference, and that
public money shall not be used, directly
or indirectly, to propagate denominational
tenets or doctrines. We have sought to
give the clearest and strongest expression
possible to these principles in the proposed
section. The arguments in favor of such
a provision are, in our opinion, conclusive,
and the objection that it will result in
making the schools 'Godless' or that such
a constitutional prohibition would imply,
on the part of the people enacting it,
hostility, or even indifference, to religion,
seem to us to be both groundless and
absurd. In adopting this section the Convention will, in our opinion, most effectively aid all that is highest and best
in religion; for by establishing the principle that State education must necessarily
be secular in its character, the field is left
open beyond question or misunderstanding
for religious teaching in the family, the
Sunday school and the church.
The
almost inevitable question has been raised
in considering the language which we have
adopted, as to whether the use of the
words 'denominational tenets or doctrines'
will in any way interfere with the
reading of the Bible in public schools
and institutions of learning. Our attention
has been called to the case of the State
ex rel. Weiss v. the District Board of
School District No. 8, in the City of
Edgerton (in the 76th vol. Wis. Reports,
page 177), in which the Supreme Court
of the State of Wisconsin decided that a
prohibition of 'sectarian instruction' prevented the reading of the Bible. Without
discussing the merits of the case or the
soundness of the position taken by the
Wisconsin court, it will suffice to say that,
in the opinion of your committee the
words proposed by us cannot, with
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any reasonable interpretation or construction, be taken to prohibit the reading of
the Bible in the public schools. We are
aware of the fact that explanatory words
on the part of the committee, or even of
this Convention, are in no sense binding
upon a judicial tribunal in construing or
interpreting a constitutional provision, but
we, nevertheless, consider it proper to
put on record our own interpretation of
the words which we submit to the Convention for its adoption.
There is one exceptional case provided for
in the first sentence of this section, in
which public money may be used in connection with a sectarian school or institution of learning, and that is contained
in the words 'otherwise than for examination or inspection' of such institutions.
This exception, in our opinion, in no way
affects the principle, except in so far
as it emphasizes even more strongly the
interest and latent power of the State,
with regard to all institutions of learning.
Without the words last quoted the question might be raised, whether the section
would not prohibit even the trifling expenditure necessary for the inspection and
examination of denominational schools
which are now connected with the University of the State of New York, and
this question necessarily raises the broader
one, as to whether this connection should
be maintained or prohibited as a violation of the principle sought to be established in this article. Your committee
were unanimously of the opinion that the
connection between denominational higher
institutions of learning and the University
of the State of New York is of the greatest advantage, not only to the institutions,
but to the State, so long as this connection
involves no further aid than is incidental
to examination and inspection.
The
policy of the State, as has been heretofore referred to. is not to monopolize
higher education, but to create one grand
supervisory university, of which all academies and colleges should be part, acting

in concert under a common control, and
yet admitting of every diversity demanded
by the sentiments and conditions of the
community in which they exist, and affording absolute freedom of instruction.
Heretofore, no distinction has been made
between sectarian and non-sectarian academies and high schools in the distribution
of the proceeds of the Literature Fund,
whereby every institution became entitled to a per capita allowance for every
student who passed the Regents' examinations, and also to a suitable contribution
to its library and scientific apparatus. This
part of the State's assistance is, in our
opinion, contrary to the sound principle of
separation of church and State, and will
be absolutely prohibited by the adoption
of our proposed amendment. It is, indeed, a matter of comparatively trifling
concern to the academies themselves, the
whole amount so distributed to sectarian
institutions in the year 1893 having been
only $5,361.09. It is not contended that
heretofore any harm or injury to the
State has come from this practice, but,
being contrary to public policy in the
highest sense, its discontinuance is demanded, not only for the sake of the
State, but of the institutions and churches
themselves. This, however, by no means
necessarily implies that the supervision of
the University and the system of regular
examinations by which the efficiency of
these institutions is tested, must be given
up. We understand that the institutions
themselves are very desirous of continuing
the Regents' examinations, and of receiving
the certificates of the University for such
of their students as shall pass them. So
far from injuring the educational system
of the State, we are of opinion that the
latter will be largely benefited by such a
course, which extends the uniformity of
excellence maintained by State institutions
to those under private and sectarian control, and which, by causing the adoption,
in many instances, of modern and thoroughly American text-books and methods,

12
necessarily tends to break down the barriers of prejudice by which our people
may be divided.
That there may be
no question of the authority of the
University to continue these examinations, the words last-above quoted have
been introduced into this section.
The second sentence of the section, 'this
section shall not apply to schools in
institutions subject to visitation and inspection by the State Board of Charities,'
has been inserted by a majority of the
committee-a
minority, consisting of
Messrs. Durfee, Hirschberg, Hill, Tibbetts,
Cornwell, Fraser and Holls, dissentingand explains itself. It must necessarily be
read in connection with the article which
may be adopted upon the recommendation
of the Committee on Charities and Charitable Institutions.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
W. HOLLS,
Chairman.
Dated Albany, August 23, 1894.67
FREDERICK

The Committee's report is noteworthy
for the fervor and strength with which it
supported the recommendation as a response to an overwhelming popular will
and, as, in actuality, an aid rather than a
hindrance to religion.
Understandably,
however, when the measure was presented
to the Convention in Committee of the
Whole, on August 31, 1894, it provoked a
sharp and acrimonious cleavage of opinion. The first issue was raised by Mr.
Joseph H. Choate, the President of the
Convention, who moved to strike the last
two lines which provided: "This section
shall not apply to schools in institutions
subject to the visitation and inspection of
the State Board of Charities." The Choate
motion was ultimately adopted after de-
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bate and the two lines were stricken.6
Mr. Choate opposed the exception of such
schools from the general prohibition on
the ground that it would provide an opening for public funds to be channeled to
such sectarian orphanages and other sectarian institutions as then or thereafter
might be subject to the jurisdiction of the
State Board of Charities. Choate feared
that such aid would go to religious schools
contained in such sectarian institutions and
thereby that the plain intent of the main
proposal would be frustrated. Choate
quoted in his support from statements made
by Frederick P. Coudert and Colonel
George Bliss, two prominent Catholic laymen who were strong advocates of Catholic education. Mr. Coudert was quoted
as saying:
My friends on the other side unanimously
speak of the common schools as the palladium of our liberties, as the cornerstone of our institutions, etc. This language
is very fine, and I am quite willing to
indorse it, and I shall not today say one
word in opposition to this plan of amendment so far as it relates to the common
schools. Let it be understood that this
system shall remain intact-that public
opinion will not tolerate a diversion of any
public moneys from their lawful object to
encourage denominational education. Put
it, if you are so inclined, into our Constitution.69

And Colonel Bliss was quoted thusly:
As to the schools, I do not care what
action you take in this Convention with
reference to an amendment bearing upon
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the common schools. Mr. Coudert has
very largely anticipated what I had taken
the pains, so that I might not be misunderstood, to write down, but I will take
the liberty of reading it, so that there may
be no mistake about it. I recognize that
public opinion believes in using funds
raised by taxation exclusively for the
public schools, and that though these
schools, as now conducted, do not meet
the requirements which Catholics deem essential to education, it is useless to oppose
public opinion as it now exists. .

.

. So,

go on with any form of amendment you
think necessary to prevent the withdrawal
of public moneys from the public to
parochial schools; you will find no present
opposition from me or those I represent.
You will, I think, find practically no opposition from any Catholic."'
Mr. Choate also expressed his fear that
retention of the exception would nullify
the existing laws prohibiting sectarian instruction and the use of sectarian textbooks in schools receiving public funds.
Mr. Choate feared that the exception could
be argued to nullify that prohibition with
respect to denominational institutions under the jurisdiction of the State Board of
Charities. 71 And the Choate address concluded with this peroration which drew
applause from the delegates:
If the Roman Catholics want their priests
and nuns to go as teachers into these
corporate parochial schools of theirs, let
them go, but let them be paid at their own
expense, at the expense of that mighty
church which draws upon the revenues of
its adherents as almost no other institution
does. If the Episcopal church wants its
priests and deacons to indoctrinate the
young inmates of the institutions which
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they have founded with the peculiar tenets
of the Episcopal church, let that church
pay for it. They can well afford to do so.
But let it not be said that we, a Constitutional Convention of the year 1894,
dared go before the people of New York
proposing that henceforth any money
should be raised by taxation for teaching
any child any doctrine or religion as distinguished from any other doctrine what2
ever.7
In response, Mr. Owen Cassidy of
Schuyler County unsuccessfully attempted
to offer an amendment which would have
barred public aid to all schools not owned
and controlled by the state or a subdivision thereof, rather than merely to
those schools conducted under religious
auspices. 73 Mr. Cassidy's theory was that
the exception only of religious schools constituted an unfair discrimination against
religion. After his motion was ruled out
of order because Mr. Choate's

motion

was properly ruled to have precedence,
Cassidy bitterly attacked the basic idea
of the entire proposed section 4 as a
"surrender to bigotry and fanaticism"
a violation of the separation of
church and state through its virtual imposition of a religious test for the reception
of public aid:
and

But, Mr. Chairman, before the adoption
of the Constitution of the United States,
our own Empire State proclaimed in no
uncertain tones her position on this subAnd in the first article of the
ject.
Constitution adopted by her in the year
1777 we read the words: 'The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination
or preference shall forever be allowed in
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this State to all mankind.' Little did the
framers of that Constitution, Mr. Chairman, dream of Mr. Holls and his amendment, little did they think that after a
hundred years of religious liberty that
there could be found any man or set of
men, anxious to steer the ship of State
back into the pathless and turbulent sea
of religious persecution, and yet, if we
are to adopt this amendment, all that
has been gained in the struggles of the
centuries will be lost. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to this amendment as
proposed by the Committee on Education,
because I believe it to be unconstitutional,
a surrender to bigotry and fanaticism, and
at war with the generally accepted doctrine
of separation of church and State. It
merely seeks to outlaw some of the
agencies in the State, because of their
religious character. The principle involved
in the separation of church and State, is
that the State, of right, exists merely for
civil ends, that it should have nothing
whatever to do with religion; that it should
make no inquiries of its citizens, servants
or agents whether such and such religious
tenets are held by them or not. ...
The principle here contended for it [sic]
that as the State shall not make a grant to
a school simply because it is a religious
school, so it should not refuse a grant
on that ground.
The State ought never to consent to
run with the bloodthirsty dogs eager to
chase down their religious prey.
The churches are not exercising the
most deadly influences in government today, and yet from the manner these A.P.A.
dogs are barking you would think that no
other influences for evil could equal
74
them.
Mr. Cassidy then proceeded to advance the "public purpose" argument
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which has figured prominently in the controversies of our own day:
A church, though primarily a religious
body, is also a civil corporation. And the
State may make grants to it for civil
reasons the same as to a peculiarly secular
organization. For instance, if the State
advertises for the use of a room or building, and the church offers one, the State
may vote money to the church for the use
of that room or building the same as it
would for the use of a room in a railway
depot.
So, if the State makes grants
to other parties for the shelter of the aged,
poor and orphans, or for giving instruction in geography, mathematics and other
secular branches, it may also make such
grants to a church, asylum or school, just
the same as to one under purely secular
control.
For in that case the State is
dealing with the church not as a religious,
but as a civil organization.
When a
church school renders the State a secular
service by giving secular instruction, it
may be given grants from the Regents
funds, just the same as any purely secular
school ...
If a church school renders the same
secular service as a non-religious school,
why should not the State make a grant
to the former as well as to the latter?
This amendment, however, proposes that
the State shall establish a 'holy or unholy' inquisition, and shall hear and entertain charges that such and such doctrines are taught, and if such charges are
proved, that such and such action shall
be taken.
Now, the State, which exists merely for
civil ends, has no more right to inquire into the religious character and teachings of
school corporations than into the religious character and teachings of an individual. The State has nothing to do except with the civil character of a citizen,
and it has nothing to do with the school
except with its civil character and the
nature of the secular instruction given
therein. As the State could not rightly
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refuse a pension to a soldier because he
belongs to a church or taught certain religious doctrines, so it cannot rightly refuse a grant to a school corporation on
any such grounds. As the State would
have no right to inquire into the religious
tenets or teachings of a man who is a
candidate for the position of sheriff or
senator, so it has no right to inquire into
the religious character of a school which
is a candidate of [sic] an agricultural college land grant or a grant from the Regents
fund. The State has no right to discriminate in the matter of grants between two
schools which render the State the same
secular service, because of religious or ecclesiastical character or relations.
Those who urged this amendment, on
the ground of the separation of church
and State, are very much like the man
who stood up so straight that he leaned
over backward at an angle of forty-five
degrees-they violate the very principle
they claim to uphold.
The United States government gives
newspaper and magazine publishers certain favors in the matter of postage,
while the rest of us pay eight cents a
pound on printed matter, they send their
publications through the mail for one cent
a pound. This is less than cost to the government. Indeed, newspapers are sent
within the limits of their own county,
free. This is equivalent to a government
grant to newspapers. The ground on
which this is justified, is that the circulation of newspapers increases popular intelligence, and is of service to the State.
Now, the same privileges are given to religious newspapers established to disseminate certain religious tenets, some of
these like the Methodist Christian Advocate being directly owned by the church.
And this is right, for these religious newspapers do as much to elevate popular
intelligence as political or commercial and
other purely secular newspapers. But, if
the government, in the matter of postal
favors and aids, does not discriminate

between religious papers and secular papers, why should it distinguish in the
matter of grants from the Regents fund,
between religious schools and those which
are purely secular. . . . The amendment
is objectionable as being ambiguous.7 5
Mr. Cassidy continued and he asked:
Would it forbid the State to hire a building or room of a church and pay rent
therefor?. .. If it be said that moneys paid
for rent of a room are paid not to help the
school, but to get the room, we might answer
that the moneys given the school from
the Regents fund are not primarily to
help the school, but to help the State,
and incidently the school, to give the instruction the State owes. ... 7
This last remark, of course, was a further
articulation of the public purpose doctrine.

Mr.

Cassidy

continued:

If an academy was controlled not by the
Catholic
church as such, but by a
board of trustees composed of Archbishop Corrigan, Mr. Coudert and other
Catholics who would manage it in the interests of the Catholic church, would it
be under the control of the Catholic
church, or only under the control of the
trustees? . . . What is meant by the words
'in which any denominational tenet or
doctrine is taught.' Is the immortality of
the soul a denominational tenet? . .7
The proposed

amendment,

Mr. Cassidy

asserted,
would be pernicious in its working, because it is indefinite. Loosely constructed
it would admit the extremes of sectarian
teachings, while strictly construed it might
be used to exclude all moral teachings
whatever. No one has yet defined 'denominational tenet or doctrine.' 78
733 REVISED RECORD
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Mr. Cassidy then attempted to allay the
apprehensions of the delegates concerning
the potential misuse of Catholic power:
Nor it is true that the Catholic church
has so great political power that it can
perhaps do what other churches cannot.
The Protestants outnumber the Catholics
eight to one in the United States, and by
a similar proportion in the State of New
York. How absurd the idea that a tenth
of the people can silence or control ninetenths. Though one-tenth of the people,
they do not hold anything like one-tenth
of the seats in the national Congress, nor
do they in any State hold more public
offices than they might fairly be entitled
to from their numbers, if equal in merit

to Protestants. It is not a help to an
aspirant to office, but rather the reverse,
to be a Catholic. It would be next to
impossible to elect a Catholic President
of the United States or Governor of the
State of New York. Where a candidate
gains one vote for being a Catholic he
will lose three. Whether it be reasonable
or unreasonable, there is a jealousy
against Catholics which will be sufficient
to frustrate any plans which any of them
may cherish of aiding their parochial
schools by injury to the public school
system. There need be no fear whatever
that the Catholic church or any other
church will ever be strong enough to
overthrow or cripple the public school
system. More than that, the Constitution
of the State protects the common school
funds, and as I began by quoting from
the Constitution, so I will close: 'The
capital of the common school

. . .

shall

be applied to the support of common
schools.' [Article 9, Section 1.] 79
In concluding his address, Cassidy introduced a letter to him from Professor
Norman Fox, apparently a Protestant, and

chairman of the Board of Trustees of
Cook Academy and Rochester University.
In Professor Fox's opinion:
This amendment proposes that the State
should institute an 'inquisition' and find
out whether a school asking a grant does
or does not teach this or that religious or
ecclesiastical tenet. But for the State to
do that is to go back to medievalism, to
violate the principle of the separation of
church and State. The State has no right
to inquire as to the religious or ecclesiastical character of a school any more
than it has to concern itself with the
religious or ecclesiastical opinions of a
citizen. .

. If it were proposed that no

Another letter introduced by Cassidy
was from Professor A. C. Hill, a Protestant, who wrote,
The measure is an infringement upon
personal liberty; a step toward union of
church and State, an introduction of a
negation of religion into our State Constitution. The measure ought to go fur8
ther or be struck out altogether. '
Mr. John H. Peck, of Troy, a member
of the Committee on Education, then rose
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State grant be given to any institution
not owned and controlled by the State,
the amendment would be consistent and
logical. But when it tries to discriminate
between church schools and those managed by other private but purely secular
corporations, it violates the principle of
the separation of church and State by
instituting an investigation into the religious character of an institution, and as
the amendment does not, and, indeed,
cannot, distinctly define church control
and denominational tenets, its enforcement would be impractical or would lead
to dishonest evasion.""
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to defend against Choate's attack on the exception permitting public aid to institutions
under the supervision of the State Board
of Charities. Peck defended this exception as a benefit and protection to the
children in those institutions and responded to the charge that they would be indoctrinated in sectarian tenets:
Why, gentlemen, upon my honor, I would
rather have a child taught to venerate the
Great Spirit of the American Indian, I
would rather have it taught any religion
upon the earth than no religion. I do not
want the homes of the dependent children
of the State of New York to furnish the
breeding places of the anarchists and socialists of the future. I want that they
should have religious training during their
tender years. And, certainly, I do not
want to say that because they have no
home they shall go ignorant in the State
82
of New York.

Some indications of the religious friction
which underlay the work of the Convention can be found in this remark by
Mr. Peck:
You think there is a public sentiment
demanding of you intolerance and bigotry,
and that that public sentiment will injure
the work of this Convention if you do
not heed it. But I tell you, gentlemen of
the Convention, there is nothing of the
kind in the State of New York. These
few agitators make a great noise. The
shallows are noisy, but the deeps are
dumb. We have had Masonic and antiMasonic agitations in the State of New
York, but they were not allowed to mar
its institutions. We have had native
American agitation in the State of New
York, but it did not put its dirty hand on
the Constitution. Shall we have this baseless, this senseless agitation which is now
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being wafted in the air, very bitter it may
be, but not reaching many people, reaching the lungs of no honest, strong American-shall we allow it to blot and
stain the Constitution which is to be offered to the people of the State of New
York? Are we going to send that kind
of thing down over the people of the
83
State?
As the debate continued, Mr. Edward
Lauterbach, of New York City, an opponent of the Choate amendment, challenged the general assumption that there
had theretofore been a continuing and
large-scale distribution of state aid to sectarian schools:
Every one connected with this subject
starts with the agreement that in response
to a sentiment here, that has really no
foundation in fact, there shall be a new
clause inserted in the Constitution to the
effect that no money shall be paid to any
parochial, sectarian, or denominational
school. One would imagine from the excitement that there were being spent vast
sums of money upon denominational,
parochial and sectarian schools; but actually the sums of money that have been
paid out in those directions in the last
year amounted to only about three thousand dollars, and in any year before that
to not quite as much; and it is limited to.
a sectarian school in Poughkeepsie, and
to a few other small sectarian schools
where the trustees of the district have
found it more to their convenience to,
make a contract with the existing Catholic school-house than in any other manner; and they would be sorry (and Mr.
Arnold, of Poughkeepsie, will tell you so)
if as a result of this constitutional amend-.
8 4ment they were prevented from so doing.
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Lauterbach, however, agreed that such
aid should be prohibited in the future, except for such institutions as orphan
asylums:
But there have been political zealots in
the Catholic church, whom no one has
supported, whom I can find to have no
who have
encouragement whatever,
through one journal and through one or
more misguided men, said they wanted
to have for their parochial schools some
portion of the public school funds. We
are all agreed, that whatever is necessary
to be done to prevent the possibility of
any such abuse in the future (because no
such abuse exists at present) shall be put
into this Constitution. We are all agreed
upon that. That is, I think a unanimous
agreement.8 5
Incidentally, in the course of the debate
on the next day, September 1st, Mr.
John T. McDonough, of Albany, a Catholic and member of the Committee on
Education, flatly stated:
I say there is not a parochial school in
the State of New York drawing one dollar
of the public money, notwithstanding all
that the President said about diverting
public school moneys to sectarian schools.
Not one dollar, I say, is paid to a parochial school. The school at Poughkeepsie,
so often alluded to, is not a parish
school; the school at Poughkeepsie is a
public school, under the Board of Public
Instruction, and regulated by that board.
The only thing about it that makes it
look like a parish school is that the women who are teaching in it wear black
dresses and carry at their sides a cross;
that seems to be objectionable.80
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McDonough went on to deny any Catholic intent to obtain public funds for the
support of parish parochial schools:
The Catholics are not drawing a dollar
from the State for parish schools, and
they are not asking a dollar. No one has
yet spoken in this State, with authority to
speak, asking a division of this school
money. If some editor in New York has
proposed it in his paper, with a view to
putting some one in a hole politically, he
had no authority to do it, and no demand
was made here for such division. Their
parochial schools are one thing; the
schools in these institutions are another.
Now, this article is very ingeniously
drawn. What have the churches of this
State done to the people that would lead
us to think them so wicked, that we
should condemn them in the Constitution?
What offense, I say, have they committed?
Are you afraid of your liberties? Are
you afraid if children are educated in
the religion of their parents that they will
destroy your liberties? You are aiming
here at religious bodies and religious
bodies only. Why, three years ago, one
of the most eminent gentlemen of this
State, who was a candidate for the nomination for Governor, was turned down,
in Republican Convention, because he had
written against religion. Now, you propose to enact here an amendment in the
Constitution that is an attack on all religious bodies.87
And the McDonough address directly
condemned the proposed section 4 as antireligious:
Why, if you said there should be no State
aid in any schools in which socialism is
encouraged, or in any school in which
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anarchy is encouraged, and you embodied
that in a proposed amendment to the
Constitution, and went to the people with
it, every one in the State would say that
your work amounted to a condemnation
of anarchy, of nihilism, of socialism.
What do you do now? You go to the
people and say, 'Not a dollar of aid to
any school in which religion is taught.'
That is a condemnation of religion. I tell
you that these religious bodies are not so
far apart as you think they are. They
got together and united at the polls in
Wisconsin - Catholics, Lutherans, and
others-and they carried the State. I expect as much opposition to this amendment from Protestants as from Catholics,
and you will find it so, mark my words.
It is a condemnation of the whole Christian religion. My learned friend, the
chairman of the Committee on Education, says it does not prevent the teaching
of religion in the schools. He says that
the Bible may be read. Well, if the Bible
may be read, hymns may be sung, and
prayers said, and I think that is the sum
total of some religions. But that is not
true of others, and so this may be ingeniously construed to exclude some and
admit others; and I am not sure but that
that was the real object intended.8
He then criticized the proposal, in words
evocative of the controversy of today, as
threatening to introduce a state-made religion into public schools:
Your proposed amendment says that no
money is to be appropriated for 'institutions of learning wholly or partly under
the control or direction of any religious
denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.' Any
denominational tenet or doctrine? Very
well, take away the distinctive doctrines
of the Baptists, take away the distinctive
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doctrines or tenets of the Methodists,
take away the distinctive tenets of the
Presbyterians, of the Episcopalians, of
the Catholics, etc., and what have you
left? What will schools teach? They will
teach a State-made religion. It is a union
of the church and State, instead of a
separation. The courts will have to tell
what kind of a religion they shall teach.
It will be some sort of religion, I know,
because the chairman of the committee
says the amendment does not prevent religion in the schools. Now, what is it?
Who is going to tell us what this religion
is? I don't know but it will be like that
of Mr. Jones, the distinguished superintendent of the House of Refuge on Randall's Island, who, some years ago, in
order to show that that institution was
non-sectarian, got up a religion of his
own. He took what he thought were the
most beautiful prayers from the Episcopal
church, the most eloquent from the Catholic, and hymns from the Methodist and
Presbyterians, and he combined them all,
and then claimed that, inasmuch as he
had the best of each, he had something
superior to any, and he blessed it and
called it Jonesism. This new religion that
we are to have under this amendment of
ours, should, out of regard for the worthy
chairman of this committee be blessed
and called 'Hollsism,' and thus have his
name go down the ages as one of the
great reformers.*89
One of the major arguments today for an
equitable sharing of church-related schools
in public funds is based upon the benefit
accruing to the public taxpayer from the
existence of those schools where children
are educated without the enormous public
cost that would result from their attendance at public schools. It is interesting to note the figures inserted into
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the record of the 1894 Convention by Mr.
McDonough on the comparative extent
of Catholic parochial education in the
State at that time:
There are in the common schools of this
State, according to the census of 1890
-I
take the United States census1,042,160 children. There are in public
schools not common 7,810. There are in
private schools, exclusive of parochial,
77,000. There are in parochial schools
of this State 119,242 children educated.
Of these, the Baptists have 1,991; the
Catholics 108,152; the Lutherans, 8,620;
the Methodists, 2,312; the Presbyterians,
848; Protestant Episcopalians, 3,736; all
others, 3,147. Now, there are 108,000
Catholic children, about one-tenth as
many as are in all the common schools
of the State, educated in parochial schools,
without costing this State one penny. Of
these, there are 40,000 in New York city.
It costs thirty dollars per head to educate
a child in the common schools of New
York city per annum. The Catholics
educate 40,000 of them without costing
the State one dollar. That is $1,200,000
a year that the State is saved. If they
had to erect buildings for these 40,000
children, the city of New York would
have to build at least thirty new schoolhouses, and with the enormous cost on a
fair estimate $3,500,000. The annual interest on this sum is $175,000 at five per
cent interest.
There is saving, then, on interest, of
$175,000. Outside the city of New York
the 68,000 children educated, at fifteen
dollars per head, would cost $1,020,000,
and to provide them with school-houses
would cost $1,000,000, the annual interest
of which, at five per cent, would amount
to $50,000 more; so that there is a total
annual saving to the public by these
parochial schools, of $2,445,000; and
Catholics ought to have credit for that.
They are giving to the State of New
York. They are paying their taxes for the
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public schools also, and they do this for
conscience sake. 90
Mr. John I. Gilbert of Malone rose to
deny that the exclusion of denominational
influences from the public schools would
result in a state-made religion. Rather
he argued, as some do today, that the
State should affirm in the public schools
and elsewhere a core of religious belief
common to all religions:
But what is religion? Why, gentlemen,
you may sweep away all these peculiar
things, and the great eternal things of
religion remain like the great sky above
us when a conflagration has swept over
a city. Now, what is religion? Why, appeal is occasionally made here, and properly to the oaths that we have taken.
That oath was that we would be true to
God, and true to man, within the sphere
of our official duties. There was religion.
The State has a religion. It believes in a
God; it believes in our responsibility to
him; it believes in the brotherhood of
man, and the reciprocal duties of men.
It believes in these things, and those are
the great fundamental things of religion.
Now, somebody has asked, when you
get together these common things, what
have you got? They say it is a State
religion. I say, you have simply religion.
And what is that, and what will it do?
Why when we have taught the pupil
obedience to God, and obedience to the
Constitution and obedience to law, what
becomes of anarchy? What becomes of
darkness when the sun rises? Teach religion that is common, teach it to the
child, but you need not teach him about
baptism; you need not teach him about
preordination, you need not teach him
about a thousand things more or less
that are peculiar to this and that and the
other denomination; but teach him the
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great fundamental things upon which all
good things upon earth depend, and all
our hopes beyond rest. Teach those. And
so I would have our schools not godless
schools; I would have the same religion
enter into the school that enters into this
Convention, and that is, loyalty to God
and loyalty to men, the rights of men.
That will leave no room for anarchy. 9 1

This idea of a "common denominator"
religion, of course, becomes untenable today if we accept the Supreme Court's
1961 definition of non-theistic beliefs as
religions. 2 In Mr. Gilbert's day, the common denominator of religion, in constitutional terms, was belief in a Creator."
Mr. Elon R. Brown of Watertown, a
member of the Committee on Education,
rose to explain that, in his opinion, the
proposed amendment denying public aid
to sectarian schools would not greatly
change the existing situation in the State:
It was, after full discussion before the
committee, stated very authoritatively that
this proposed sectarian amendment was
not intended to effect any fundamental
change in the existing order of things;
that there was nothing in the State of
New York which it was necessary for us
to overturn or to revolutionize. We found
that there had been some petty innovations which the modern telegraph and
newspaper had exploited throughout the
State for the purpose of arousing the
ancient bigotry that characterized man
three or four centuries ago; and for the
purpose of preventing the further spread
of this feeling of bigotry, and as some
excited gentleman said in the public appearances before this Convention, and

said before the committee, for the purpose of preventing a religious war, which,
forsooth, we stood in danger of, the committee in its wisdom thought it wise, after
great hesitation and deliberation and by
a narrow majority, to make a declaration
against the invasion of the common
schools of the State by any religious denomination. There was not in the mind,
I believe, of any man in that committee
any such immediate danger, but people,
with the old feeling of bigotry aroused by
trifling incidents, stood knocking at the
doors of this Convention, in large numbers, for the admission of a principle
that was as old almost as the principle,
94
'Thou shalt not steal.'
The growing danger of religious division
in the Convention was alluded to by Mr.
Chester B. McLaughlin of Essex County:
We have arrayed upon one side feeling
and upon the other side feeling, and the
very spectacle which is here presented
will be intensified in every part of the
State. Fix this article so that now, and
for all times to come, there shall be no
question but that the State is engaged in
just one cause, educating its children,
making them good citizens. The State
knows no religion; it has no religion. It
seeks what? To make good citizens for
the State, and nothing else. We know no
Catholics; we know no Jews; we know
no Methodist, and, I hope that time will
never come when the State shall know
one sect from another. I say to this Convention it will not do when we seek to
create class or division among the citizens
of this State. I hope to see this section
so framed that we can go to the people
of this State with an article which says
that the school fund of this State shall be
used for one purpose and one purpose
only, and that is to educate all of the
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people, all of the citizens in the common
95
schools of the State.

When Mr. Mirabeau Lamar Towns of
Brooklyn then rose to argue for a continuation of state aid to denominational
orphanages and similar institutions, he
gave voice to another conception of religion as serving a public purpose for

society:
Now, Mr. Chairman, all of us recognize
that religion and that the religious denominations are the leaven which hold
society together today. We all recognize
that the Catholic church, that the Protestant denominations are the most efficient
police force which society has today to
withstand the onslaughts of atheism, anarchism and for the perpetuation of all
that is good, moral and lofty in our lives.
Why is it, then, that we should seek to
hamper in any way those noble teachers
of doctrines which hold our very fabric
of society together, which are the foundation of the State, which are the foundation of all good and successful government-why should we seek to impair their
efficiency by the insertion of an article
which is covert, indistinct, but which, if
it means anything in the world, means
that children committed to their care, the
children whom they foster, the children
whom they seek to nurture and bring up
and educate to good citizenship, shall not
receive any instruction at all, if in the
institutions where they abide any religious
tenet, doctrine or denominational theory
is taught? Mr. Chairman, what we need
to-day is more religion. The different
sects and denominations should get together, and the voice of the preacher
should be heard proclaiming to the world
that it is easier for a camel to go through
the eye of a needle than that a rich man
should get to heaven. That is the kind of
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religion we want. We don't want the religion that comes from the voluptuous
lips of well-fed ministers and priests,
preaching to the rich, encouraging them
in their onslaughts against society, against
morality, against honesty, instead of trying to persuade them from the absorption
of all the wealth and the riches of the
world; we want those who go out into
the fields, who preach on and up, proclaiming good, healthy, sound religious
doctrine to the whole world, and we do
not want anything, any religious doctrine
that will curtail that spirit, that will cut it
down, or that will deprive the coming
generations of this world of its beneficent
influences. 96
It is interesting to note that, although
the procedural issues in the Convention
did not primarily concern the main provision of the proposed section 4, but were
rather over the proposed exceptions in
favor of denominational orphanages and
the like, nevertheless, there was considerable discussion of the fundamentals of
the general issue of religion and the state.
For example, Mr. Henry R. Durfee of
Wayne County delivered an address in
which he opposed any specific exception
in favor of orphanages, on the ground
that no judge could conceivably consider
them to be interdicted by the proposed
general prohibition against aid to schools,
since an orphanage is obviously not a
school. And in that speech, Mr. Durfee
went to a basic issue:
We are here, Mr. Chairman, seeking to
lay down a principle. Let us make it
clear, definite, certain; let us not engraft
or seek to engraft upon it any exception.
We are here, standing for the protection
and the defense of the common schools
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of this State, the schools of the masses,
as distinguished from the schools of the
classes, the schools which have proved
the crucible in which have been fused
into one homogeneous mass the diverse
elements of our citizenship; the schools
which make for the safety, for the perpetuity of the State. Let us make our
utterance here distinct, clear, emphatic,
and by so doing we shall eliminate from
all the discussions of the future in this
Convention, and every succeeding Convention, any element of religious bitterness, and shall take away every occasion
for controversy over matters of religious
belief. For once let it be established in
the fundamental law that the schools of
the State are safe from invasion or attack
by any denomination, and the main
ground of religious dispute in connection
with public questions is forever removed.
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I trust
that this Convention will recognize that in
this article, at least, there is no place and
no need for any exception, and that this
amendment, and all amendments . . . in

the first paragraph of this section, will be
7
voted down.

9

Mr. Frederick W. Holls of Yonkers,
Chairman of the Committee on Education,
then rose to support the position of the
Committee. Where the opponents of the
cutoff of aid to sectarian schools had argued that a prohibition against such aid
would violate the separation of church and
state by requiring the state to pass judgment on religious matters, Mr. Holls presented the same argument in behalf of the
cutoff:
Sir, the principle sought to be established
by this section, as it now stands, and as
I hope it will stand, because I know it
will be endorsed by an overwhelming ma-
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jority of the people of this State-that
principle, so far as religion is concerned,
is a simple one, and it is this, that any
instruction given by the State must necessarily be secular; and to say that it is
secular does not say that it is irreligious.
It is senseless to use that argument. The
State exists for one purpose; religious
communities for another. One is necessary to the other, but their functions are
entirely different; and the absolute proof
that this principle is true, and that State
instruction must be secular, is found, if
we follow out the thought one step further; for then we see that, if the State
can teach any religion, it must, in all
honor and justice, teach all religion, and
this means that it must decide what is
religion and what is true religion. If the
State of New York has the right, directly
or indirectly, to provide religious denominational instruction for any child, it has
the duty to see that even the very least
of these poor children gets the whole
truth, the whole revelation of God, not
abating one jot or tittle, and gentlemen
will see how absurd it is to ask the State
of New York to decide what faith that
shall be. It has been suggested that we
would make the schools godless; that the
persons who advocate this amendment
here and who, I hope, will triumphantly
carry it through this Convention and before the people, will go down to history
as being the promoters of godless schools,
as though that were a very terrible indictment. Sir, it would, indeed, be terrible if it were true that what we are
doing is an act of hostility to true religion.
But it is not. We simply establish and
wish to maintain the principle of free,
independent secular schools, and that is
a very different thing. And that is the
remark with which I close and yield the
floor to my friend from New York, that
secularity, in the opinion of all those who
opposed this proviso, and who now ask
this Convention to pass the section and
the article as it stands-secularity is the

12
only principle, and, hence, the best policy
for the State, for every church in the
State, and necessarily for us here who
hold the supreme power of State. If the
church wants to go on, and I hope it will
go on in its glorious career of making
men better and purer and holier, the first
condition is to 'render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's.' It will not be
until that is carried out to its full extreme
and its full extent, as it will be by this
new Constitution in the State of New
York, if adopted-not until then, that the
church and the people of this State will
be in the true position to devoutly, humbly and freely to 'render unto God the
things which are God's.' 98

Mr. Elihu Root of New York City concluded the argument for the supporters of
the unqualified prohibition of aid to sectarian schools, and he finished on this
note which was characteristic of the arguments on that side:
Therefore, I believe that every true
American, of whatever religion, will be
for this section as it stands now. It is
not a question of religion, or of creed,
or of party; it is a question of declaring
and maintaining the great American principle of eternal separation between church
and State. 99
When the entire education article came
up for a third and final reading on September 15, 1894, some of the delegates
addressed themselves strongly to the fundamental church-state issues involved in
the education question.
Mr. Louis McKinstry of Fredonia
opened the debate with a strong exposition
of the peril of irreligion and attacked the
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proposed educational article of the Constitution as discriminatory against religion. He said:
Mr. President, I shall vote against this
educational amendment, as reported by
the committee, because I am not one of
those who consider the great danger menacing this nation by the union of church
and State. That possibility becomes more
and more remote each passing year, and
the condition against which we may well
feel the greater apprehension is of the
time when we may have no church and
no State. The forces with which civilization has to contend, even now, are not the
religious organizations, but that great
mass of ignorant desperate population
transplanted to our shores, destitute of
respect for law, and of every sentiment
that even savors of religion.
I hear complaint that in some public
school in this State the local authorities
have seen fit to employ Sisters of Charity
to teach a primary department. The proposed amendment will not stop that, for
it does not forbid boards of education
from employing teachers of any particular religious sect, nor proscribe their accustomed garments, and it is denied that
these teachers are instilling any particular
religious doctrine. But even if they should
intimate to some ragged little boy that
there is a life beyond, that there is a
higher responsibility than forced obedience to a human teacher, that there are
other faculties to be cultivated than those
which master arithmetic and spelling, the
sight of those devoted women in garb of
black, is far more pleasing to me than
the scenes which even the present generation in Paris has witnessed, of women in
red, armed with incendiary torches and
leading mobs imbued with the spirit which
President Garfield aptly called 'The red
fool fury of the Seine.'
I have comparatively few Roman
Catholic constituents, and my ancestors
lived in the region of old Londonderry,
where it was considered an act of the
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highest service to God to kill a Catholic.
I have no predilections in favor of that
sect, but I have lived long enough and
traveled extensively enough to coincide
with the conclusion of General Lew
Wallace, the author of the greatest Christian romance of the age, when he says
that 'Any religion is better than no religion.' Place your amendment on the
solid ground of public school money exclusively for public schools, and then add
your prohibition of religious teaching,
and I will vote for it, because it does not
discriminate unfairly but this amendment
reported by the committee says to every
private corporation now conducting or
which may hereafter establish a school
or academy in this State: If you are infidel or atheistic, if you have no religion
about you, the State treasury is at your
service; but if you are controlled by religious people of any sect, you shall be
forever barred from receiving one dollar
of public money. For such a discrimination as that I shall never vote.
Mr. President, gentlemen glibly talk of
the absolute divorce of church and State.
The English-speaking race has always
recognized religion in the State. Would
you uproot it? Then you must abolish
our form of solemn oath in the halls of
justice; no longer permit public officers
to qualify with hands upon the holy Bible;
cease the morning ministrations of clergymen upon yonder rostrum; never again
recognize the priestly office in the rite of
matrimony; cut from our school books
the account of Washington's prayer at
Valley Forge; omit the closing invocation
from our National Hymn. Our AngloSaxon tongue speaks the chosen language
of liberty. Wherever upon the face of the
globe its accents are heard, there law and
order and also religion are established.
Thirty-seven years ago the great historian Macaulay wrote to a friend in New
York the following gloomy prediction
concerning our future:
'Either some Caesar or Napoleon will

seize the reins of government with a
strong hand, or your republic will be as
fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the
Roman empire was in the fifth-with this
difference: that the Huns and Vandals
will have been engendered within your
country by your own institutions.'
Mr. President, I trust that dire prophecy may never prove true, but I believe
that the first step toward its realization
will be the act of setting religious bodies
against each other and filling the people
with the insane idea that their great
danger lies in recognizing religion in the
State. With vice rampant and corruption
triumphant in high places, the flood of
ignorance and anarchy constantly increasing, let us welcome rather than repel
every possible means of good to the human race. At least, let us not discriminate against them as this amendment
proposes. 100

Mr. H. Austin Clark of Tioga County
responded to Mr. McKinstry's attack upon
the amendment.

It is interesting to note

that Mr. Clark's defense of the article was
premised upon his belief that the article
still permitted the teaching of theistic religion in public schools; therefore, he
maintained, the article was not anti-re-

ligious but rather was designed merely to
prevent the intrusion of inter-denominational rivalry into the public schools.

It is hardly likely that Mr. Clark would
have defended the article so vigorously,

and perhaps unlikely that he would have
even supported it, if he had
the state of affairs in our day,
the public schools are forbidden
even the fact of the existence
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Mr. Clark's comments included the following:
Mr. President, I do not understand this
amendment as some of the other delegates
seem to understand it. It has been said
here upon the floor that it would prohibit
the reading of the Scriptures even in the
public schools of the State; it would prohibit the teaching of any religious doctrine in the public schools of the State.
I must confess, in examining the language
of this amendment, I do not construe it
in that way. I do not believe that it
means that the fact that there exists a
deity should not be taught, or that the
great principle of religion should not be
taught, but, on the other hand, that denominationalism should not be taught in
the schools of the State. It does not say
anything about the great principles of
religion. It means to say that Catholicism,
Presbyterianism, Methodism, the doctrines
of immersion, the doctrines of the different sects, should not be taught in the
public schools of the State. I believe that
the amendment is right; that the proposition as it stands should be adopted; that
religion as a principle can be taught, not
as a denominational doctrine, but as a
great, broad principle that is believed by
nearly all the people of the land. I hope
that this article, as reported to this Convention, will be adopted, with the addition of the amendment of Mr. Foote,
which I hope will also be adopted. 101
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ment are founded on religion. There is
not an educational board in the State
which does not ask every applicant, who
comes before it to be employed as a
teacher, whether he or she is a professor
of religion, and then they go on and
question them, and before they get through
they are apt to ascertain what church
they belong to. When you say there is no
such thing as religion in education, I contend that it is not so. Why, it permeates
every single department of education and
always will; and if the time ever comes
when it does not you will find this is no
longer a nation. You may talk against
it, you may put into the Constitution all
the laws you see fit, but it still exists, and
102
it always will exist.
Mr. McIntyre went on to charge that
the adoption of the proposed article would
excite the very religious issues it sought
to quiet and would lead, among other
things, to a demand by Catholics that all
religious instruction be removed from the
public schools. Then, Mr. McIntyre accused the delegates of acting out of partisan motives:
I will tell you gentlemen, I do not think
you really understand this. I think you
have been looking too much for political
favor, and not at the real interests of the
people. It has been said that the people
of the State of New York have come here
and cried out against it.

I deny it."-'

Similar thoughts were voiced by Mr.
John G. McIntyre of Potsdam who also
voted for the article:
There was no agitation in our public
schools about religious matters. When
people get up here and say they will
divorce church and State absolutely in
education, I say it is an absurdity on its
face. The very principles of our govern-
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In explaining his vote against the article, Mr. William Deterling of New York
City flatly asserted that its motivation was
anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic:
Mr. President, according to the provisions of this proposed amendment, I believe it is aimed directly at the Catholics
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and Hebrews for the purpose of preventing their seeking State aid. Although a
Protestant, I am, nevertheless, desirous of
being fair and just. I am of the opinion
that all denominations should be treated
04
alike, and I, therefore, vote no.1
Mr. James P. Campbell of New York
City, in explaining his vote against the
article, complimented the Roman Catholic
delegates for their self-restraint but he predicted that the article would prove to be
a source of division in the state and he
claimed that it was based upon groundless fears of sectarian raids upon the
state treasury:
Mr. President, in explaining my vote,
which will be against this section, I desire
to say that I think this Convention is
making a grave and serious mistake in
throwing this fire brand into the political
contests this coming fall. Very few know
so well as I what magnificent self-restraint
was exercised by the Roman Catholic
members of this Convention during the
discussion of this amendment, but the
people of this State cannot restrain themselves. That is one reason.
Another is, that the article is based
upon a pretended fear that church and
State might some day be united. I say
pretended fear, because I believe no man
here has any real fear that any such union
would ever be attempted or could be consummated. This pretended fear was attempted to be supported by statements
that persistent and enormous raids were
made upon the public treasury in the
name of charity, but in reality to support
one form of religion and to educate and
support a priesthood, and that these raids
were made in the interest of a so-called
foreign hierarchy. But these statements
have been found on investigation to be
false, and were so pronounced to be by

the President of the Convention, and no
man dissented from what he then said.
It comes to this, therefore, that we are
now enacting a constitutional provision
based upon statements of alleged facts
and upon fears which are now conceded
to be both groundless and false. I cannot,
consistently with truth, subscribe to any
such provision, and I, therefore, vote
05
no.
Mr. Henry A. Powell of Brooklyn, in
explaining his vote for the article, observed that "this Convention has not been
able to rise to the dignity of settling this
vexed question." 10c
The Convention then voted, 108 to 37,
to adopt the educational article as Article
IX of the Constitution, including the prohibition in section 4 against public sup10 7
port of sectarian schools.
Developments from 1894 to 1938

In the years since the Convention of
1894, there have been very few cases di-

rectly construing the prohibition, in Article IX, Section 4, of public aid to sectarian schools.
In Sargent v. Board of Educ. ,1

the
Court of Appeals held that a Roman
Catholic orphan asylum was neither a
"school" nor an "institution of learning"
within the meaning of Article IX, Section
4. As an orphan asylum, the institution
in question was held to be within another constitutional provision 109 permitting
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cities, towns and villages to provide for
the secular education of inmates of orphanages, correctional and similar institutions under private control."' The New
York State Education Law, incidentally,
continues to provide for state aid to denominational orphan asylums I" and denominational institutions for the deaf and
blind. 1 1 2 The Sargent Court was influenced
not only by the specific constitutional authorization for such aid in Article VIII
but also by the unreasonableness of the
argument that expensive and impractical
alternate arrangements must be made to
ensure the insulation of the orphans from
any religious influence in the educational
process:
But it is contended in behalf of the
plaintiff that public moneys ought not
to have been used for the education of
children in an orphan asylum maintained
by any church or religious organization.
The plaintiff is evidently willing that the
children should be educated but in some
other place than the asylum. It is said
that children ought to be removed from
the influence of religious teaching in the
asylum and especially the influence of
female teachers who belong to some religious order and wear the garb of that
order. It is quite clear, I think, that
such objections do not rest upon any
reasonable foundation. In the first place,
it is perfectly obvious that these children
could not receive instruction in any other
place. They were under the exclusive
control of the managers of the asylum.
They were in a certain sense deprived of
their liberty. Some of them may have
been sent to the asylum after conviction

110Sargent v. Board of Educ., 177 N.Y. 317,
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for crime, and in such cases they may,
when of a certain age, be committed to
such an institution by magistrates, courts
and judges. (Corbett v. St. Vincent's InThe
dustrial School, 177 N.Y. 16).
children that were placed in the asylum
otherwise, that is, by parents and guardians, were under the same discipline and
control, and it is plain that they could
not be discharged from such control or
the discipline of the institution. In some
sense it would be about the same as discharging boys from the county jail in
order to permit them to attend the common schools. . . . When we look into
the debates on this subject in the Constitutional convention when the provisions
of the Constitution already quoted were
the subject of debate it is clearly apparent
that the members of that body understood
that instruction in the case of orphan
children detained in an asylum was neither
practicable nor possible elsewhere than in
the institution itself. The four teachers in
question were licensed by the public authorities to teach. To license them as
qualified teachers and employ them and
receive the benefit of their services and
then refuse to pay them upon the objection of some taxpayer would be a
species of injustice unworthy of a great
state.11'
Article IX, Section 4, was specifically
directed against aid to sectarian education
and there have been some few cases in
which we can measure the impact of the
section where schools rather than orphanages and the like are involved. In
St. Patrick's Church Society v. Heerman,' the state supreme court held that
a Catholic elementary school was en-

11Supra note 110, at 325-27, 69 N.E. at
725.
11 68 Misc. 487, 124 N.Y. Supp. 705 (Sup. Ct.
Steuben County 1910).
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titled to be supplied with water from the
defendant company which had contracted
with the Village of Corning to supply free
water to "all schoolhouses" in the village.
The court rested its opinion on the idea
that plaintiffs were not seeking public
moneys or property from the village, but
were rather merely seeking private property, i.e., water, from the defendant company which had agreed with the village
to furnish the water to "all schoolhouses"
free. In fact, the court noted that if
plaintiffs were seeking to compel the village to perform a contract requiring the
village to furnish free water to plaintiff's
school, "defendant's contention would, perhaps, be correct. . . ." 11 The court
similarly distinguished O'Connor v. Hendrick,"", where a teacher in a public
school, wearing the garb of a religious order, was held not entitled to payment out
7
of public funds."1

was at least not strongly in favor of, and
was probably opposed to, any change in
Article IX, Section 4.119
In Smith v. Donahue," the court invalidated the free distribution of textbooks and ordinary school supplies by
the city of Ogdensburg to parochial school
pupils. Article 33-A of the Education
Law authorized city boards of education:

The Convention of 1915 made no
change in Article IX, Section 4. Interestingly, Delegate Alfred E. Smith introduced
a proposed amendment to repeal Article
IX, Section 4, but the Smith proposal
was referred, without debate, to the Committee on Education where it remained
buried." 8 At the time of the 1915 Convention, it was evident that public opinion

reference here was to Article IX, Section
4 of the New York State Constitution,
although the court also made a passing,
and noncommittal, reference to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 1 23 Significantly, the court laid
considerable stress on its rejection of the
argument that the books were furnished

to provide textbooks or other supplies to
all the children attending the schools of
such cities in which free textbooks or
other supplies are lawfully provided prior
121
to the time this act goes into effect.
The court held that the parochial
schools were not part of the educational
system of the State and that they were
not "schools of the city of Ogdensburg"
within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, the court observed, in dictum, that
if the governing statutes did permit the
furnishing of school supplies to the parochial schools, "our opinion is that they

would be unconstitutional."
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RELATION-

STATE

OF

NEW

YORK 144-45 (Cath. Univ. of America, Educational Research Monographs 1951).
120 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y. Supp. 715

(3d Dep't 1922).
21

Laws of New York, 1917, ch. 786, § 868
(4).
122 Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 664,
195 N.Y. Supp. 715, 722 (3d Dep't 1922).
1

12.31d.

at 659, 195 N.Y. Supp. at 718.
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to the pupil and not to the parochial
schools:
In practice in the city of Ogdensburg the
principal and a teacher of a parochial
school have made requisitions for the number of books of each kind required for
the school, for readers, arithmetics, spellers, geographies, English books and histories. These books have been procured
by the board of education and delivered
to the school; but the defendants say that
books and supplies, while so procured
and furnished, are furnished under the
above section of the Education Law
(§ 868, subd. 4) to the children attending
the schools and not to the schools. Even
though we accept the statute as meaning
that the books and supplies are to be
furnished to the pupils and not to the
school, we think the act plainly comes
within the prohibition of the Constitution;
if not directly in aid of the parochial
schools, it certainly is indirect aid. The

"directly or indirectly" to sectarian schools.
On the other hand, it is fair to assert that
subsequent developments, which we shall
discuss below, have rendered such a strict
interpretation untenable.

scholars do not use textbooks and ordinary
school supplies apart from their studies in

the school. They want them for the sole
purpose of their work there. There is
no question but that the text-books and
ordinary supplies are furnished direct to
the public schools; there is no thought
that they are furnished to the scholars as

It is worth noting here that, in 1927,
the New York Court of Appeals held that
Article IX, Section 4, was not infringed
by a released-time program under which
public school pupils were released from
school for one-half hour each week for
the purpose of attending religious instruc-

distinct from the schools; neither can there

tion classes in church

be such a thought in the case of the
parochial schools.

1 24

It is possible to interpret the court's
position here as an indication that, if the
books had in fact been given directly and
solely to the child, the gift would have
been valid. However, it is more likely
that, even had the books been given
directly to the child, the Smith court
would have invalidated the arrangement
on the ground that Article IX, Section 4,
prohibits the furnishing of public aid,

124

Id. at 661, 195 N.Y. Supp. at 719.

In Ford v. O'Shea,1

25

the court upheld

the rental by public school authorities of
classroom space from church schools,
where
the curricula

...

of studies followed in

the classrooms referred to in this action
are identical with those followed in other
public school classrooms throughout the
city, and the teachers presiding over
the
1 26
classes are public school teachers.

Also, in none of the classrooms in question were there "any pictures . .. statues
or other paraphernalia pertaining to or
connected with any religious group, congregation or sect." 127

schools. 128

The

matter of released time is, of course,
governed today by the McCollum v.
0
1 29
and Zorach v. Clauson1
Board of Educ.

cases which the Supreme Court of the
United States decided under the first
amendment and which we shall discuss

125 136 Misc. 921, 244 N.Y. Supp. 38 (Sup.

Ct. N.Y. County 1929).

Id. at 922-23, 244 N.Y. Supp. at 40.
ld. at 923, 244 N.Y. Supp. at 40.
128People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y.
195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927).
129333 U.S. 203 (1948).
130343 U.S. 306 (1952).
126

127
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later. The unanimous opinion of the
Court of Appeals in Graves is useful,
however, as a less dogmatic construction
of Article IX, Section 4, by the highest
court of the state only five years after the
rigid opinion of the appellate division in
Smith. The Graves decision overruled an
earlier lower court decision on the con131
stitutional point.
In 1930, in Cochran v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Educ.,'1 32 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that provisions of the
constitution of Louisiana forbidding the
giving of public aid, "directly or indirectly," in aid of any church, sect or denomination, and flatly providing that "no
public funds shall be used for the sup1 33
port of any private or sectarian school,'
were not violated by a state appropriation
for the lending of secular textbooks to
children in church-related schools. The
Louisiana constitutional provisions were
very similar, in their phrasing and impact,
to Article IX, Section 4 of the New York
State Constitution. The interpretation
by the Louisiana courts, sustaining the
provision of the textbooks, is inconsistent
with the interpretation by the New York
court in Smith. 34 The principal issue

131Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y.
Supp. 822 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1925).
The tenor of the overruled Stein case can be

seen in the court's finding there of a violation
of section 4 in the printing of cards by public
school authorities to be used by parents to

before the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Cochran case was whether
the Louisiana appropriation deprived the
objecting citizens of their property without due process of law. The Supreme
Court held that there was no violation
of the due process clause and the Court's
unanimous opinion, by Chief Justice
Hughes, emphasized the public purpose
rationale:
Viewing the statute as having the effect
thus attributed to it, we can not doubt
that the taxing power of the State is
exerted for a public purpose. The legislation does not segregate private schools,
or their pupils, as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with any matters of
exclusively private concern. Its interest
is education, broadly; its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided
only as the
common interest is safe15
guarded.
Significantly, the Supreme Court noted
that it was "not of importance in relation
to the Federal question" that it was "only
the use of the books that is granted to
the children, or, in other words, the books
are lent to them."' 136
It is important, in relation to Cochran,
to append the cautionary note that, at
the time of the decision, the Supreme
Court had not yet adopted the view that
the requirements of the first amendment
were made applicable by the fourteenth
amendment to the states. The Court has
since adopted that view 137 and, therefore,

specify the type of religious instruction they

wished their children to receive. The cards cost
a total of $2.87. Id. at 697, 211 N.Y. Supp.
at 825.
132 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
133 LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13 (1921).
134 Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168
La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929); Cochran v.

Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1030, 123
So. 664 (1929).
'a' Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).
"a6 Ibid.
137 See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
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directly or indirectly,] in aid or maintenance
[other than for examination or inspection,] of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, [or in which any denominational
tenet or doctrine is taught] and in which
children receive religious instruction.3 9

the Cochran decision, while it is persuasive in its reasoning, would not be conclusive today in a case involving a similar
factual situation.
Between 1894 and 1938 there were
several amendments seriously proposed to
relax the prohibitions of Article IX, Section 4, but none received enough support
to be submitted to the people. Three
types are of interest because of their contrasting approaches. One proposal was to
legitimize affirmatively the extension of
state aid to the secular activities of churchrelated schools. It would have amended
Article IX, Section 4, to read:
[Neither the] The state [nor] or any
subdivision thereof, [shall] may use its
property or credit or any public money,
or authorize or permit either to be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance of the secular education [other than

for] including examination or inspection,
of any school or institution of secular
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational
138'
tenet or doctrine is taught.
An earlier variant of this direct authorization was proposed in 1934:
[Neither the] The state [nor] or any
subdivision thereof, [shall]

may use its

property or credit or any public money,
[or authorize or permit either to be used,

1935-S. Int. No. 503, S. Pr. No. 532, by
Mr. Howard. Amended, recommitted and not
reported. A. Int. No. 1292, A. Pr. No. 1381,
by Mr. Doyle. Not reported. 1936-S. Int. No.
128, S. Pr. No. 128, by Mr. Howard. Not
reported. A. Int. No. 154, A. Pr. No. 154, by
Mr. Doyle. Not reported. 1937-S. Int. No.
287, S. Pr. No. 293, by Mr. Howard. Not
reported. See II REPORT OF 1938 CONSnTUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE 792.
'13

And a more detailed proposal of similar
import was advanced in 1936 and 1937:
[Neither the] The state [nor any subdivision thereof,] shall not use its property
or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, didirectly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational
tenet or doctrine is taught; but this
action shall not preclude the legislature
from authorizing and empowering any
political subdivision of the state from appropriating and contributing from its
public money to the maintenance, conduct,
operation and upkeep of any such school
or institution of learning to the extent of
fifty per centum of the ascertained cost
of the maintenance, conduct, operation
and upkeep thereof, upon such terms and
conditions as any such political subdivision
may impose and require; provided, however, that in such event no appropriation
or contribution of public money made by
any such political subdivision to any such
school shall vest or operate to vest in any
such political subdivision or in any board,
bureau, commission or official thereof any
right of property in any such school or
institution of learning or any power of
supervision and regulation over its curricula or any part thereof. The legislature

1934-A. Int. No. 1510, A. Pr. No. 1633,
by Mr. Dennen. Not reported.
131)
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shall have power to enable appropriate
legislation hereunder.140

A contrasting type of proposal would
have permitted the state to reimburse localities on the basis of total school attendance, instead of only public school
attendance:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit or
any public money, or authorize or permit
either to be used, directly or indirectly, in
aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or
institution of learning wholly or in part
under the control or direction of any
religious denomination, or in which any
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.
The provisions of this section, however,
shall not be construed to prevent the state
from giving public moneys as state aid
to cities and other political subdivisions
for education on the basis of children in
attendance in private and/or parochial
141
schools.

A more explicit version of this approach
was proposed in 1937:
§ 4. Neither the state nor any subdivision
thereof, shall use its property or credit
or any public money, or authorize or
permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than
for examination or inspection, of any
school or institution of learning wholly
or in part under the control or direction
of any religious denomination, or in which
any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught.

The provisions of this section,

1936-A. Int. No. 2345, A. Pr. No. 2804,
by Mr. E. S. Moran. Not reported. 1937A. Int. No. 2345, A. Pr. No. 2804, by Mr.
E. S. Moran. Not reported by Rules Comm.
(1938 Report, II, 793).
127, S. Pr. No. 127, by
141 1936-S. Int. No.
Mr. Hendel. Not reported. (1938 Report, II,
791).

however, shall not be construed to prevent
the state from giving public moneys as
state aid to cities and other political subdivisions for maintenance of private schools
operated by religious denominations on
the basis of children in attendance in such
schools where the same are not operated
standards
for profit and conform to the
142
of the state board of regents.
A third approach would have sanctioned
the introduction of religious training, and
sectarian teachers, into the public schools:
[Neither the] The state [nor any subdivision thereof,] shall not use its property
or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of
learning, wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational
tenet or doctrine is taught; but this
section shall not preclude the legislature
from authorizing religious training for
pupils in schools or institutions of learning,
supported in whole or in part by public
funds, under the direction of instructors
professing the same religious faith, designated by duly constituted religious bodies.
The religious training authorized shall be
afforded at the times prescribed by the
legislature and the instructors shall receive
43
no compensation from public money.'
Judd v. Board of Education.
In 1936, the Legislature amended Section 206 of the Education Law so that it
provided as follows, with changes and
additions underlined herein:

140

1937-A. Int.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
I, 792).
143 1937-A. Int.
Mr. McLaughlin.
II, 793-94).
142

No. 41, A. Pr. No. 41, by
Not reported. (1938 Report,
No. 351, A. Pr. No. 355, by
Not reported. (1938 Report,

12
18. Whenever any district shall have
contracted with the school authorities of
any city, or other school district for the
education therein of the pupils residing
in such school district, or whenever in any
school district children of school age shall
reside so remote from the schoolhouse
therein or the school they legally attend
that they are practically deprived of school
advantages during any portion of the
school year, the inhabitants thereof entitled to vote are authorized to provide,
by tax or otherwise, for the conveyance
of any or all pupils residing therein (a)
to the schools of such city, or district
with which such contract shall have been
made, or (b) to the school maintained in
said district and to schools other than
public, situate within the district or an
adjacent district or city. Whenever conveyance of pupils shall be so provided
for by vote of the inhabitants, the school
district and the school trustees shall provide, if need be, one or more routes so
that all children of school age in said
district shall equally be afforded transportation facilities.
And the trustees [thereof] of the district may contract with any person, corporation or school district for such conveyance when so authorized in accordance
with such rules and regulations as they
may establish, consistent with rules and
regulations of the Commissioner of Education, and for the purpose of defraying
any expense incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this subdivision, they may
if necessary use any portion of the public
money apportioned to such district .... 144
What this 1936 amendment did was to
authorize the extension to parochial school
pupils of transportation theretofore provided by school districts to public school

Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 20304, 15 N.E.2d 576, 579 (1938) (quoting N.Y.
EDUCATION LAW § 206).
144
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pupils only. Ultimately the church-state
issue involved reached the Court of Appeals, and the Court, in Judd v. Board of
Educ.,'1 45 ruled that the amended section

206, insofar as it authorized the use of
public funds to provide transportation for
pupils to and from parochial schools, was
violative of Article IX, Section 4 of the
State Constitution. The majority opinion
in the Court of Appeals was written by
Judge Rippey. Chief Judge Crane and
Judges O'Brien and Loughran dissented
in an opinion written by Chief Judge
Crane.
In his opinion for the Court, Judge
Rippey first stated that
private, denominational and sectarian
schools, and schools or institutions of
learning in which denominational tenets or
doctrines are taught or those wholly or in
part under the control or direction of any
religious denomination are no part of and
are not within . . . the common school
system of the State. ...14

After reciting the early history of the
common school system, the Court concluded, "thus common school education
within the State came exclusively under

public control
mained.

' ' 147

and

has

since so

re-

Moreover, not only are sec-

tarian schools not part of the common
school system and not only are the common schools exclusively under public control, but also, as the Court noted, Article
IX, Section 4, specifically forbids any use
of public money "directly or indirectly"
for the support of "church-related
schools."

145278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
146 Id. at 205-06, 15 N.E.2d at 579.
1471d. at 208, 15 N.E.2d at 580.
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it was discriminatory, that it was contrary to the requirements of public welfare,
and that support of religious schools was
in fact given to the children rather than
to the schools involved, were urged but
without success, and proponents of the
efforts to authorize denominational schools
to receive State aid in connection with
education were compelled to submit to
the conclusion that it was contrary to
public opinion and contrary to the theory
under which the free common school
system was founded.

"This section," said the Court, "restricts the use of all public moneys or
moneys raised by taxation for educational
purposes exclusively to the common
schools." I'l The governing educational
policy was summarized by the Court as
meaning that
since our organization as a State we have
clearly and unequivocally indicated that
there must be a complete severance between denominational or sectarian schools
on the one hand and the public common
schools on the other.1

49

It is interesting to note the way in
which the Court majority in the Judd
case interpreted the debates in the 1894
Convention. It will be useful to quote
this extract in full from the Court's opinion:
When the proposal to amend article IX
of the Constitution was taken up in the
committee of the whole (Revised Record
of the Constitutional Convention, 1894,
vol. 3, p. 689 et seq.), the report of the
committee on education contained the
clause that 'this section [referring to
section 4] shall not apply to schools in
institutions subject to the visitation and
inspection of the State Board of Charities'
(p. 739). This clause would have nullified the effect of the other provisions of
section 4 as finally adopted. The clause
was stricken out on the grounds, among
others, that it 'is in flagrant derogation
of a sound and universal principle, that
none but public schools shall receive the
support of public moneys, and that the
people of this State, or any section of this
State, shall not be taxed for the support of
education of a sectarian nature in any
schools whatever.' The arguments against
the present constitutional provision, that

148

14,

Ibid.
Ibid.

As we have already noted, the proposed
exception in favor of "schools in institutions subject to the visitation and inspection of the State Board of Charities" 150 was not rejected by the 1894
Convention on its merits but rather because it was thought better to incorporate
that provision for institutional schools into the article relating to charities.'
It was apparently felt by most of the
delegates that to leave the exception in
Section 4 of Article IX could lead to a
progressive dilution by implication of the
general prohibition of that section against
aid to sectarian schools. The elimination
of the Charities exception from Section 4,
however,

does

not justify an inference

that the general desire to restrict public
funds to public schools was so intense
that the delegates

actually took the ex-

treme course of cutting off public aid to
schools in denominational orphanages, reformatories and the like.
The Judd Court then further summarized the statutory and constitutional
scheme in this way:

Id. at 209-10, 15 N.E.2d at 581.
151 See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 14 (1894).
150
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We furnish free common schools suitable
for all children of the State regardless of
social status, station in life, race, creed,
color or religious faith. Any contribution
directly or indirectly made in aid of the
maintenance and support of any private or
sectarian school out of public funds would
be a violation of the concept of complete
separation of Church and State in civil
affairs and of the spirit and mandate of
52
our fundamental law.1
Then the Court discussed various arguments in favor of extending the transportation aid to pupils in parochial schools.
First the Court disposed of the argument
that the aid was extended to the children
and not to the parochial schools:
The argument is advanced that furnishing
transportation to the pupils of private or
parochial schools is not in aid or support
of the schools within the spirit or meaning
of our organic law but, rather, is in aid
of their pupils. That argument is utterly
It not only ignores
without substance.
the spirit, purpose and intent of the constitutional provisions but, as well, their
exact wording. The object of construction as applied to a written constitution
is to give effect to the intent of the
people in adopting it and this intent is
to be found in the instrument itself unless the words or expressions are ambiguous (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) Vol. I, pp. 124-26). There
is nothing ambiguous here. The wording
of the mandate is broad. Aid or support
to the school "directly or indirectly" is
proscribed. The two words must have
been used with some definite intent and
purpose; otherwise why were they used
at all? Aid furnished "directly" would be
that furnished in a direct line, both literally and figuratively, to the school itself,
unmistakably earmarked, and without circumlocution or ambiguity. Aid furnished

152

Supra note 145, at 211, 15 N.E.2d at 582.
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"indirectly" clearly embraces any contribution, to whomsoever made, circuitously, collaterally, distinguished, or otherwise not in a straight, open and direct
course for the open and avowed aid of
the school, that may be to the benefit
of the institution or promotional of its
interests and purposes. How could the
people have expressed their purpose in
the fundamental law in more apt, simple
and all-embracing language? Free transportation of pupils induces attendance at
the school. The purpose of the transportation is to promote the interests of
the private school or religious or sectarian
institution that controls and directs it.
'It helps build up, strengthen and make
successful the schools as organizations.'
(State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del.
181, 187, writ of error dismissed, Feb.
15, 1938). Without pupils there could be
no school. It is illogical to say that the
furnishing of transportation is not an aid
to the institution while the employment of
teachers and furnishing of books, accommodations and other facilities are such an
aid. In the instant case, $3,350 was appropriated out of public moneys solely
for the transportation of the relatively few
pupils attending the specific school
in question.
If the cardinal rule that written constitutions are to receive uniform and
unvarying interpretation and practical construction is to be followed, in view of
interpretation in analogous cases, it cannot
successfully be maintained that the furnishing of transportation to the private
or parochial school out of public money
is not in aid or support of the school.
A similar argument was advanced in Smith
v. Donahue (202 App. Div. 656), in
State ex rel. Traub v. Brown (supra),
and in Williams v. Board of Trustees
(173 Ky. 708, reversing on rehearing,
153
172 Ky. 133) and discarded.

153

Id. at 211-13, 15 N.E.2d at 582.
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It is significant that the Court relied
on the prohibition in Section 4 of aid
given "directly or indirectly" implying
thereby that the provision of transportation to parochial school pupils would not
amount to the giving of aid "directly" to
those schools.
A most important aspect of the Judd
decision is that it was rendered before the
decision of the United States Supreme
54
Court in Everson v. Board of Educ.,1
which upheld, under the first amendment,
a provision of public transportation to
parochial school pupils. It is not idle
conjecture to imagine that at least one
member of the Judd majority could have
been swayed had the extensive opinions
in Everson been then available for consideration. Indeed, the Judd Court noted
the scarcity of authority and indicated
that it was influenced in its decision by
two reported decisions, one from Wisconsin and one from Delaware:
We have found but two decisions upon
the precise question involved in this case
(State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180

Wis. 109, and State ex rel. Traub v.
Brown, supra), in both of which it was
held that the furnishing of transportation
at public expense to private or parochial
school children was prohibited by the
provisions of their respective Constitutions
which were similar to ours. To like effect
was Report of the Minnesota AttorneyGeneral, 1920, page 300.' 5

State Bd. of Educ.156 did not involve any
construction by the Supreme Court of the
Louisiana Constitution, which was similar
to Article IX, Section 4 of the New York
Constitution. Rather, the Supreme Court
in Cochran merely held that the Louisiana
statute, providing secular textbooks at
public expense for parochial school pupils
was not such a taking of private property
for a public purpose as would violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. And, on the interpretation
of the Louisiana Constitution, the Judd
Court flatly sided with the three-man
minority of the seven-man Louisiana court
in the related case of Borden v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ.157 The three Louisiana
dissenters were quoted approvingly by the
Judd majority as follows:
To say the least, the appropriation of the
public funds for the purchase of books
for all the children of the State is an attempt to do indirectly that which cannot
be done directly. The argument of resultant benefit to the state must and does
fall before the rule of public policy established in the organic law itself that
the welfare of the state can be best promoted by prohibiting appropriations from
the public treasury in aid of any church,
religious denomination, private charitable,
or benevolent purpose, private or sectarian school.""8

Judge Rippey properly observed for the
majority that the United States Supreme
Court decision in Cochran v. Louisiana

The Judd Court next relied upon the
absence of authority sustaining a public
provision of tuition fees for pupils in parochial schools. And the Court implicitly
rejected the child benefit theory in tuition
cases:

1.4 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

156

281 U.S. 370 (1930).

35 5 Supra note 145, at 213, 15 N.E.2d at 582-

157
158

168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
Supra note 145, at 214, 15 N.E.2d at 583.
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The courts of this country have been
unanimous in prohibiting the use of public
funds to pay, directly or indirectly,
tuition fees of pupils in private or sectarian schools (Williams v. Board of
Trustees, supra; Otken v. Lamkin, 56
Miss. 758; Synod of Dakota v. State, 2
S.D. 366; Opinion of the Justices, 214
Mass. 599; People ex rel. Roman Catholic
Orphan Asylum Soc. v. Board of Educ..
13 Barb. 400) in spite of the argument
presented that tuition fees were for the
benefit of pupils exclusively and not for
the schools and the economic argument
that it would be less expensive for the
State to pay the tuition fees of these
children in private schools than to pro159
vide for them in public schools.
Here again, it is questionable whether

the one-man majority of the Judd Court
would have endured if there had been
then available for consideration the sub-

sequent cases and legislation which will be
discussed later in this study.

stated this self-evident proposition:
No authority has been called to our
attention nor has one been found in any
jurisdiction to the effect that a statute purporting to be enacted in the exercise of
the police power of the State may be held
valid if repugnant to any constitutional
provision or restriction.' 60
Court

appeared
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if it were within the police power, whether
it was invalidated by the prohibition of
Article IX, Section 4. It was hardly conducive to clarity for the Court to imply
that the issues in the Judd case could be
resolved merely by a restatement of the
obvious rule that no legislative enactment
can stand if repugnant to the Constitution.
Then, in a strict interpretation, which
implied a total rejection of the public
purpose theory which later found higher
favor in Everson and other cases, the
opinion of Judge Rippey refused to moderate the strictures of the constitutional
provision by any consideration of health
or safety:
No claim, or right to transportation furnished by public funds can be asserted in
the interest of the health, safety and welfare of the pupils of the private or parochial school for any such claim is moderated by the specific provision of the
Constitution .... 161

Rejecting the argument that the police
power, especially as it includes a governmental capacity to protect minors, warrants the provision of bus transportation
to parochial school pupils, the Judd Court

Here, the

CATHOLIC

to

beg the

For the issue in Judd was,
first, whether the bus transportation statute
was within the police power and, second,

question.

The three dissenting judges joined in
a strong opinion written by Chief Judge
Crane. The Crane opinion posed the
chief question as "whether the Legislature
has authorized a political subdivision of
the state to use its money in aid or main,,126
(in the words of Article
tenance..
4)
of
a parochial school. If
IX, Section
so, the legislation would be invalid and
the majority opinion of Judge Rippey
would be correct. If not, then the legislation would be valid.
The dissenters regarded the statute as
properly directed toward the public purpose of implementing the existing laws
requiring children to receive instruction

1591d.

161 Id.at 217, 15 N.E.2d at 584.

160

162 Id. at 219, 15 N.E.2d at 585.

at 214-15, 15 N.E.2d at 583.
Id. at 216, 15 N.E.2d at 584.
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and recognizing their right to obtain such
instruction in private schools:
Having made attendance upon instruction
compulsory and having approved of attendance at certain schools other than
public schools, the Legislature determined
that the inhabitants of the district should
have the power, under certain conditions,
to provide for the transportation of the
pupils to and from the schoolhouse in the
district or the school which they legally
attend. The object of such legislation
is apparently to insure the attendance of
the children at their respective schools for
the requisite period of instruction and,
perhaps, to safeguard the health of the
children. The statute is not designed to
aid or maintain the institutions themselves.
Recognizing the right of the children to
be sent to such schools, and enjoining
upon them the duty of regular attendance,
the Legislature gave the authorities power,
in a proper case, to assist the children
in getting to their school. The law says
to the children and parents: Having
chosen a proper school, you must attend
regularly. The school district has been
given the power to add to that: Where
necessary, we shall assist you in getting
there. 163
The dissenters regarded the transportation aid as given to the pupils and not
And Chief
to the parochial schools.
Judge Crane emphasized that any resultant assistance to the schools was conjectural and slight at most:
In most cases those in parental relation
choose the school at the beginning of the
school year, and the arrangements for
transportation cannot be initiated until
the attendance figures show whether and
to what extent such facilities may be
needed. There is no benefit to the schools
except, perhaps, as one may conceive an

163

Id. at 220-21, 15 N.E.2d at 586.

accidental benefit in the sense that some
parents might place their children in
religious schools when they anticipate
transportation provision, though they might
hesitate to do so if the children were
64
compelled to make their own way.1
In concluding his opinion, Judge Crane

obliquely implied that the majority opinion
in Judd violated the intent of Article IX,
Section 4, by placing an unfair and discriminatory burden upon church-related
schools:
The constitutional provision is not designed to discourage or thwart the school
where religious instruction is imparted.
'Denominational religion is merely put
in its proper place outside of public aid
or support.' (People ex rel. Lewis v.
Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 198)." ',,
The Convention of 1938.
The Convention of 1938 acted promptly
to reverse the Judd decision. Although
the record of debate on this question is
sparse, we do have a clear indication of
On July 27,
the Convention's attitude.
1938, the Convention voted, 135 to 9,
to amend Section 4 of Article IX by
adding at the end, "but the legislature may
provide for the transportation of children
to and from any school or institution of
learning." I66 Earlier, Mr. William J. Wallin, Chairman of the Committee on Education, read into the record this statement on behalf of the Committee:
The Court of Appeals decided in the
case of Judd v. Board of Education of

Id. at 221, 15 N.E.2d at 586.
Id. at 221, 15 N.E.2d at 586, quoting from
People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195,
198, 156 N.E. 663, 664 (1927).
1 6 2 REVISED RECORD 1598 (1938).
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Hempstead, reported in 278 N.Y. 200,
that the provisions of Section 4, Article IX
of the Constitution, prohibit the use of
public funds to pay for the transportation
of pupils to and from private schools or
schools wholly or in part under the direction of any denomination or in which
denominational tenets or doctrines are
taught.
The proposal now offered continued in
the Constitution the prohibition against the
use by the State or any subdivision thereof, of its property, credit or any public
money, directly or indirectly in aid or
maintenance, other than for examination
or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part
under the control or direction of any
religious denomination, or in which any
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught,
but expressly excepts from such prohibition the use of public funds to pay
for the transportation of children to and
from any school or institution of learning.
This meets the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in the Judd case and allows the
use of public money therein held void.
This is accomplished by empowering the
Legislature to provide for such use of
public funds, in language which the
committee feels is apt, and which our bill
drafting bureau also advises.
The Legislature twice passed a bill to
effect the results sought by this proposal.
The second of such bills was enacted
into law and was the subject of the ruling
of the Court of Appeals in the Judd
case. Your committee feels that the proposal should be supported. 167
And Mr. Wallin is quoted elsewhere as

saying:
To meet a decision of our Court of Appeals, that an act of the Legislature permitting transportation of children at public
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expense to a denominational school violated the constitution, and to give effect to
an almost unanimous sentiment in the

convention that the aid was indirect and
small and partook of the nature of a
social welfare measure, it was agreed to
recommend an amendment to the existing
section reading 'but the Legislature may
provide for the transportation of children
to and from any school or institution of
18
learning.' 6
When the amendment was voted on
by the Convention, Mr. Irwin Steingut
offered this explanation of his vote in
favor of it. When Mr. Steingut's name
was called he said:
Mr. President, I would ask to be excused
from voting and briefly state my reasons.
In 1936, Mr. President, the Legislature
of that year passed a bill to carry out
the intent of this proposal. Unfortunately,
because of the constitutional prohibition,
the Court of Appeals was compelled to
hold that it was contrary to the Constitution of the State of New York.
The President:

"With a dissent."

Mr. Steingut:
However, there was a Court of Appeals
decision.
That decision, I understand,
was handed down on May 24th. Immediately thereafter, on May 25th, I introduced a proposal to carry out that which
we are doing this morning, except that
that proposal went further and calls for
health service. I understand that that
portion of my bill has been introduced by
the Committee on Welfare and will be
offered on this floor at a subsequent date.
I am happy in the thought that the will
of the Legislature of 1936, together with
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the signature of the Governor of that
year, to carry out the purpose of this
proposal, will now place the Legislature
of 1939 in a position to carry out that
which we intended to do in 1936.
I vote Aye, Mr. President. 1 9
The proposal which Mr. Steingut introduced on May 25th would have added
a new Section 6-a to the Bill of Rights
in Article I as follows:
All children of this state without regard
to race, creed, color or the school they
attend shall have equal rights to all health
and welfare services, transportation and
secular text books provided with public
funds. The state or a subdivision thereof providing any such services and benefits shall extend them equally to all
children. Nothing in this constitution
shall prevent the carrying out of the provisions of this section by the State or any
subdivision thereof.'

70

When Mr. Steingut introduced this
measure it was referred to the Committee
However, nothing furon Education.' 7
ther came of this proposal, which would
have forbidden the exclusion of parochial
school children from health and welfare
services provided to children at both the
state and local levels. Mr. Steingut's reference to the Committee on Welfare apparently

related

to

an

amendment,

1 72

introduced by the Committee on Social
Welfare, which was adopted by the Convention. This proposal of the Committee

on Social Welfare amended the renumbered Section 1 of Article VIII to provide:
Subject to the limitations on indebtedness
and taxation applying to any county, city
or town, nothing in this constitution contained shall prevent a county, city or town
from making such provision for the aid,
care and support of the needy as may be
authorized by law, nor prevent any such
county, city or town from providing for
the care, support, maintenance and secular
education of inmates of orphan asylums,
homes for dependent children or correctional institutions and of children placed
in family homes by authorized agencies,
whether under public or private control,
or from providing health and welfare
services for all children. (Emphasis ad-

ded.)
This amended Section 1 of Article
VIII permitted, but did not require, the
extension of health and welfare services
to all children at the local level. No
corresponding provision had been in the
Constitution theretofore. When the Committee on Social Welfare in the 1938 Convention recommended this amendment,
which ultimately was incorporated in Article VIII, Section 1, it said:
In substance the Committee on Social
Welfare recommends to the Convention
and urges that the revised Constitution
provide for the following basic principles:
5. That the health and welfare of the
child during the formative period
of this school age shall be promoted by the State irrespective of
17
the school he attends. '3

1692 REVISED RECORD 1598 (1938).

2 Proposed Amendments, N.Y. Constitutional
Convention (1938), Int. No. 505, Pr. No. 532.
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments
(1938)].
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In the debates on this proposal there
was no discussion of the provision authorizing health and welfare services for parochial school children. Mr. Steingut made

242 (1938).

Proposed Amendments (1938), Int. No.
687, Pr. No. 797.
1722
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no recorded comments on the proposal
and he voted for it when it was adopted
by a vote of 146 to 2.174
A similar provision 5 was introduced
by the Committee on Social Welfare to
authorize and not require the provision
by the state legislature of "health and
welfare services for all children." This
proposal was ultimately adopted and inserted the following language in Article
VII, Section 8:
Subject to the limitations on indebtedness
and taxation, nothing in this constitution
contained shall prevent the legislature from
providing for the aid, care and support
of the needy directly or through subdivisions of the state; or for the protection
by insurance or otherwise, against the
hazards of unemployment, sickness and
old age; or for the education and support
of the blind, the deaf, the dumb, the
physically handicapped and juvenile delinquents as it may deem proper; or for
health and welfare services for all children,
either directly or through subdivisions of
the state, including school districts; or
for the aid, care and support of neglected
and dependent children and of the needy
sick, through agencies and institutions
authorized by the state board of social
welfare or other state department having
the power of inspection thereof, by payments made on a per capita basis directly
or through the subdivisions of the state; or
for the increase in the amount of pension
of any member of a retirement system
of the state, or of a subdivision of the
state. The enumeration of legislative
powers in this paragraph shall not be taken

1744
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to diminish any power of the legislature
hitherto existing.
This proposal was included in the report of the Committee on Social Welfare,
mentioned above, in which the Committee
urged that the Constitution follow the principle,
that the health and welfare of the child
during the formative period of his school
age shall be promoted by the State irrespective of the school he attends."7 6
The amended Section 8 of Article VII
was ultimately adopted by a vote of 108
to 42.1"' There was extended debate on
various aspects of the matter as it related
to health insurance, but there is no recorded debate in the Convention on the
religious issue involved in extending health
and welfare services to all children.
It seems clear that it was the intention
of the Committee and of the Convention
that health and welfare services at both
the state and local levels could be extended to children attending church-related
schools, regardless of the restriction in
Article XI, Section 3, on other types of
aid to those children and to their schools.
Both Article VII, Section 8, which deals
with state powers, and Article VIII, Section 1, which deals with local powers,
provide in broad language that "nothing
in this Constitution contained" shall prevent the extension of the health and welfare services to all children. This evidently was intended to mean that not even
the stringent prohibitions of Article XI,
Section 3, will prevent the extension of
such health and welfare services to all

3139 (1938).
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children. If the Convention intended oppositely to provide that Article XI, Section 3 was not overridden by Article VII,
Section 8 and Article VIII, Section 1, the
Convention should have said in those sections, "nothing in this section contained"
shall prevent the extension of the health
and welfare services. If the Convention
had so provided and if Article XI, Section
3 were, therefore, paramount, then Article
VII, Section 8 and Article VIII, Section
1 could be argued not to authorize the
provision of health and welfare services to
children attending church-related schools.
All that those sections would then authorize, it could be argued, would be the extension of health and welfare services to
children attending public schools or nonchurch-related private schools.
The fact, however, is that the Convention used in those two sections the
broad language to provide that "nothing
in this Constitution contained" shall prevent the extension of health and welfare
services to all children. The intention is
quite clear that even Article XI, Section
3 is overridden by this authorization.
Moreover, a revealing episode in the Convention occurred when delegate William J.
O'Shea, Jr., moved successfully to restore
this broad language to the amendment
which became Article VIII, Section 8:
The Secretary:
. . . Strike out the
new matter ...reading . . . 'This section
shall not, however, and insert . . . "subject
to the limitations on indebtedness and taxation, nothing in this Constitution contained shall.'
Mr. O'Shea: Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is to undo what
was accidentally done by Mr. Moffat
when he sought to include, properly, a
reservation of this section to the consti-

tutional provisions on indebtedness and
taxation, but unintentionally the amendment
offered this afternoon overruled the decision in Sargent v. The City of Rochester and the present practice of the State,
and the amendment is designed to cure
that error of this afternoon. The amendment has been drafted by Mr. Moffat and
is satisfactory to Mr. Moffat, Mr. Wallin
and Mr. Corsi.
The Chairman: The question occurs
upon the adoption of the amendment as
offered by Mr. O'Shea. All those in favor
signify by saying Aye; contrary, No.
The Amendment has been adopted.'- 8
Mr. O'Shea was referring to the case
of Sargent v. Board of Educ.,17" in which

the Court of Appeals held that the provision of secular education to inmates of
a Roman Catholic orphanage did not
violate the section now numbered Article
XI, Section 3, because the orphanage was
neither a school nor an institution of
learning within the meaning of that section. Having found that the payment did
not violate that provision, the court went
on to find that it was otherwise authorized
by Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution of 1894, which permitted the use
of public money for the secular education
of inmates of church-related orphanages.
Mr. O'Shea apparently felt that the omission from Article VII, Section 8, of the
broad language, "nothing in this Constitution contained," could jeopardize the basic
holding of Sargent that the aid given in
that case does not violate Article XI,
Section 3. The adoption by the Convention of the O'Shea amendment is, at
least in this respect, an indication that

17."
17'

3 REVISED RECORD 2200 (1938).
177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904).

12
the Convention intended the words,
"nothing in this Constitution contained,"
to mean what they say, that is, that no
provision of the Constitution, including
Article XI, Section 3, would prevent the
extension of health and welfare services
to "all children" including those attending
church-related schools.
Unfortunately, the New York State Attorney General ruled in 1943 that public
funds cannot be granted for a non-educational child care project operated in a
denominational school?8s0 The premise of
the Attorney General's brief opinion was
that Article VII, Section 8, is subject to
the limitations of Article XI, Section
3:
In arriving at my conclusions, I have
also had in mind Article VII, Section
8 of the Constitution. There is no
question as to the State's right to provide
funds for health and welfare services for
all children, but when those funds so
granted are to be used in a manner 'directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance

'

then that grant would be in viola-

'so 1943 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 118.
181 1943 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 118, 119.
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In my opinion of May 12, 1943, I stated
that the mere fact that a building is
owned by a religious corporation does not
prevent its use by public agencies or nonsectarian private agencies for non-educational projects; and that the use of a
portion of a building for a Sunday School
would not prevent a public agency or
private social agency from conducting a
child care project therein. My opinion,
however, was predicated on the fact
that the purpose of the child care program was to provide care and not instruction and that the program as stated
in that Council's original inquiry, was not
an educational one. The statement concerning the Church of All Nations refers
to a 'nursery school' which, I assume,
must have educational features.
In my opinion, a nursery school comes
within the terms of my May 12th opinion,
that a child care project can not be maintained in the building of a school or institution of learning conducted by religious

. . . of any school or institution of learn-

...
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In a subsequent opinion, five days later,
the Attorney General invalidated, on the
same grounds, the use of public funds for
a nursery school conducted in a churchrelated community center:

ing wholly or in part under the control
or direction of any religious denomination
tion of the Constitution.
In my opinion there is no prohibition
against the granting of funds for child
care aid in conformity with Chapter 196
of the Laws of 1943, to any organization,
public or private, social or charitable, providing the child care project is not conducted or maintained in the same structure, building or edifice as any school
or institution of learning wholly or in
part under the control or direction of any
religious denomination. 181
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This view, that the restriction of Article
XI, Section 3, against aid to church-related schools qualifies the authorizations
of health and welfare services for all
children, was adopted by the Supreme
Court of Nassau County in 1963 in a
case in which the court upheld the provision at public expense of home teaching
to a parochial school student who was

182
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confined to bed for several months with
a rheumatic heart condition. 18 3 The court
first held that Section 1709, subdivision
24, of the Education Law, under which
the tutoring was provided, was authorized
by Article VII, Section 8 of the Constitution. But then the court held that
subdivision 24 must be measured against
Article XI, Section 3, which, the court
held, qualifies the authorization of Article
VII, Section 8. On the merits, the court
held that subdivision 24 did not violate
the terms of Article XI, Section 3. It
will be useful to quote here the passage in
which the Scales court rejected the argument of the petitioner, the father of the
child, that Article VII, Section 8 is not
subject to the restrictions of Article XI,
Section 3:
It would appear to be petitioner's view,
if the Court does not mistake the implications of the arguments in its memorandum
of law, that the portion of Section 8 of
Article VII, of the New York Constitution which declares that 'nothing in this
constitution contained shall prevent the
legislature from providing for . . . the
education . . . of . . . the physically

handicapped' relieves subdivision 24 from
the restrictive effect of any constitutional
limitation including the limitation on direct and indirect aid to denominational
schools in Section 4 of Article XI. The
Court entertains serious reservations as to
the soundness of this view. This provision in the second paragraph of Section
8, as the Court interprets its language,
seems to have been designed to legitimize
public expenditures for education of the
physically handicapped as against con-

183 Scales v. Board of Educ., 41 Misc. 2d 391,
245 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1963).

stitutional restrictions, like those in the
first paragraph of Section 8, Article VII,
forbidding the use of public money for
private purposes. It does not seem by its
language to have reference to a constitutional provision which, like Section
4 of Article XI, deals with prohibitions on
aid to denominational schools and does
not, on its face, prohibit public aid to
the physically handicapped. 1943 Opinion
Attorney General 119 seems to take a
similar view of the relationship between
Section 8 of Article VII, and Section 4
of Article XI. Thus the Court must reach
the question of whether or not the application of subdivision 24 urged by the
petitioner infringes Section 4 of Article
XI, and must determine whether home
teaching of petitioner's daughter is directly or indirectly in aid of or maintenance of the parochial school which she
had been attending up to the time of her
illness and which, according to petitioner's
counsel on oral argument, she will attend again when she is well. Patently the
furnishing of home teaching to Kathleen
Scales is not 'directly' in aid or maintenance of her parochial school and the
definition of direct aid enunciated in Judd
v. Board of Educ. (278 N.Y. 200, supra),
corroborates this view. But does it constitute indirect aid to that school? The
Court thinks not. The benefits of home
teaching will inure solely to the pupil,
petitioner's daughter, and it appears that
these benefits may be physical as well
as mental. It is difficult to conceive how
the parochial school will obtain any real
advantage from it. The fact that home
teaching will enable petitioner's daughter
to retain her level of achievement and
earn promotion to the next higher grade
in the normal course would seem to be
184
no financial aid to the parochial school.
184

Id. at 399, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
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It would seem fair to say that the construction adopted by the Attorney General
in 1943 and by the Scales court in 1963
is not in accord with the intention of the
1938 Convention. It would also seem
reasonable to suggest that the Convention
to be convened in 1967 ought to rectify
this apparent misconstruction.
It is interesting in passing to note some
of the other proposals which were introduced in the Convention of 1938 but
were not acted upon. There were several
amendments introduced to legitimize the
provision of bus transportation for parochial school children, 8 0 in addition to the
one finally adopted by the Convention.'8s
Another proposal, introduced by Mr. Poletti, would have allowed "the furnishing
of transportation, health and welfare services and secular textbooks to pupils or
students of denominational schools or institutions." 187 Another approach, embodied
in an amendment introduced by Mr. Heffernan, would have permitted aid to such
schools by local governments by adding to
section 4 a proviso that:
but this section shall not preclude the
legislature from authorizing and empowering any political subdivision of the state
from appropriating and contributing from
its public money to the maintenance, conduct, operation and upkeep of any such
school or institution of learning to the
extent of fifty per centum of the as-
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certained cost of maintenance, conduct,
operation and upkeep thereof, upon such
terms and conditions as any such political
subdivision may impose and require; provided, however, that in such event no appropriation or contribution of public
money made by any such political subdivision to any such school shall vest or
operate to vest in any such political subdivision or in any board, bureau, commission or official thereof any right of
property in any such school or institution of learning or any power of supervision and regulation over its curricula
or any part thereof. The legislature shall
have power to enact appropriate legislation hereunder. 88
Another proposal, introduced by Mr.
Murray, would have permitted religious instruction in the public schools by adding
a new Section 5 to Article 9:
§ 5 Religious Instruction. Nothing in this
constitution shall prevent the legislature
from permitting religious instruction, under
the direction of a duly constituted religious
body, for pupils in the free common
schools by instructors of the same religious
faith as the pupils instructed. The religious instruction so permitted shall be
given to a child only with parental consent and at the times prescribed by the
legislature; but no compensation shall be
paid from public moneys for such instruction.18 0
It may be of interest today that it was
also proposed that any school receiving
state aid or enjoying exemptions from
property taxes be forbidden to "deny the
use of its facilities, or refuse admission,
to any person otherwise qualified, by

656, Pr. No. 723, by Report from Comm. on

Educ.
(1938), Int.
181 See 2 Proposed Amendments
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628, Pr. No. 656, by Mr. Osborne.
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of his race, color, religion

or

political belief." 190

The 1938 Convention, in sharp contrast
to that of 1894, was marked by a hospitality toward church-related schools and
toward all religions in general. Although
the subject of taxation of religious enterprises is a subject of another study, it is
worth mentioning here that the 1938 Convention formalized the long-standing policy
of exempting religious properties from
taxation by adding the following provision
as Article XVI, Section 1:
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted away,
except as to securities issued for public
purposes pursuant to law. Any laws
which delegate the taxing power shall
specify the types of taxes which may be
imposed thereunder and provide for their
review.

Exemptions from taxation may be granted
only by general laws. Exemptions may
be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used

exclusively for religious, educational or
charitable purposes as defined by law and
owned by any corporation or association

organized or conducted exclusively

for

one or more of such purposes and not
operating for profit.

The New York State Constitutional Convention Committee recommended that the
1938 Convention continue this policy with
a strong statement recognizing the public
benefit derived from religious enterprises:

190 1 Proposed Amendments (1938), Int. No.
312, Pr. No. 331, by Mr. Hooper. See also 2
Proposed Amendments (1938), Int. No. 597,
Pr. No. 625, by Mr. Halpern; 1 Proposed
Amendments (1938), Int. No. 49, Pr. No. 49,
by Mr. Gootrad.

Exemption of Religious Property.
Real property belonging to a corporation or association organized exclusively
for religious, bible, tract, or missionary
purposes, or for the moral or mental improvement of men or women, as stated,
and used exclusively in carrying out
thereupon these purposes, is exempt from
taxation. The theory underlying all these
exemptions, says the New York State
Commission for the Revision of the Tax
Laws, is that of desirable public purpose.
In early colonial days when the church
and the state were closely bound together, the church was granted exemption as a matter of course. It was the
duty of the church in those days to relieve the state of much of its charitable
burden and to assure public order by its
teachings of morality and personal conduct. Here then was an arm of government considered by many to be as important as some of the other administrative agencies more generally connected
with the public authority, and, as such,
it was granted all of the privileges and
immunities commonly granted these bodies.
The adoption of the Federal and State
Constitutions guarantying religious freedom and giving formal assurance of
separation between the Church and the
State in the United States and every state
therein has been made the basis of argument that all historical ground for the
exemption from taxation of religious institutions was swept away by these constitutional provisions. But the exemption
appears to rest on broader grounds. There
was no alteration in the practice following the adoption of these constitutions.
The need for the moral teaching and
charitable efforts of the church was still
felt. The old practice of exemption was
so entirely in accord with public sentiment that it universally prevailed. The
government thereafter continued to aid

12
the work of the church by means of tax
exemption, and the church, through its
teachings of morality and personal conduct, has contributed and contributes to
public order and the observance of the
law. It is not necessary to defend the
exemption of its property upon its appeal
to public sentiment. The chief concern
of the State is public order.
To these basic reasons for the continuance of the policy of exempting religious properties from taxation are sometimes added the reasons that (1) churches
and the surrounding open spaces belonging to them add beauty and dignity to a
neighborhood, promote better utilization
of the surrounding land and increase
the value of the adjoining properties, thus
reducing the tax rates of small property
owners in the other parts of the locality;
that (2) the church buildings cannot be
used for any other purposes than those
carried on in them by the church itself
and have, therefore, little, if any commercial value; and that (3) the churches
are generally poor and would be compelled
to close their doors and discontinue their
worthy services to their local communities,
if they were subjected to taxation. The
consequent losses to the communities
would be immeasurable.
The total volume of exempt religious
property in the State, exclusive of that
classified under the title of 'moral and
mental improvements'
in 1936, was
$564,078,000, or approximately 37.51o of
all private exempt realty. The distribution of this religious property as between
different classes was as follows:
Buildings and grounds
used as places for religious worship ...... $553,654,000
Property of religious
corporations occupied
by officiating clergymen ................
8,060,380
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Property owned
clergymen ..........
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by
2,363,930.191

The new Section 1 of Article XVI
formalized the tax exemption of property
used for religious, education or charitable
purposes and it aroused no recorded controversy on that score in the 1938 ConThere seemed to be general
vention.
agreement with the observation of delegate Martin Saxe that the granting of
such tax exemptions
has been the policy of the State because
these religious and educational and charitable institutions perform a social function which otherwise might have to be
192
taken care of by the State.
At the very least, it can be said that
the Convention of 1938 was fairly hospitable toward religion and its actions reflected the growth of a more equitable
public climate of accommodation in religious matters. The Convention of 1967
ought to reflect the continued development
of that climate over the past three decades.
The Aid Prohibition in the Content of
Major Relevant Judicial Decisions
The prohibition against aid which was
inserted in Article 9, Section 4 of the 1894
Constitution was renumbered Article XI,
Section 4 by the Convention of 1938. Subsequently, it was renumbered by vote of
the people on November 6, 1962, as
Article XI, Section 3. This Blaine Amendment reads as follows:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit or
191
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any public money, or authorize or permit
either to be used, directly or indirectly, in
aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or
institution of learning wholly or in part
under the control or direction of any
religious denomination, or in which any
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught,
but the legislature may provide for the
transportation of children to and from
any school or institution of learning.
Before examining certain alternatives to
this aid prohibition, it will be useful
to survey the major judicial trends, before and after 1938, which cast doubt
upon the desirability of retaining that
prohibition as a part of the fundamental
law of the State.
There are two basic constitutional provisions which must be considered here.
One is the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, which provides, in
relevant part, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . . ." This amendment has been
held to be "wholly applicable to the
states," rendering them "as incompetent
as Congress" to enact the forbidden types
of legislation. 19 3

The other basic con-

stitutional provision is Article XI, Section
3 of the New York State Constitution.
Also, Article VII, Section 8 of the New
York State Constitution prohibits the use
of state money in aid of private undertakings, but specifically exempts from that
prohibition the state educational funds:
The money of the state shall not be given
or loaned to or in aid of any private

193 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 215 (1963).

corporation or association, or private undertaking; nor shall the credit of the
state be given or loaned to or in aid of
any individual, or public or private corporation or association or private undertaking, but the foregoing provisions shall
not apply to any fund or property now
held or which may hereafter be held by
the state for educational purposes.
Another part of Article VII, Section 8,
specifically permits state aid to private
orphanages and other health and welfare
institutions as well as to private schools.
However, as far as schools are concerned,
it is evident that Article XI, Section 3,
singles out church-related schools as the
only type of private schools which may
not be aided by the State. On the local
level, Section 1 of Article VIII forbids a
city, town, village or school district to
make a gift or loan in aid of "any individual, or private corporation or association,

or private undertaking.

.

This section, however, permits local aid
to the support and education of inmates
of private orphanages, correctional institutions and the like and also allows the
provision of "health and welfare services
for all children."
Therefore, the only
types of private schools which may be
aided by local governments are those
which are for the inmates of such private
institutions as reformatories and orphanages. And, of course, under Article XI,
Section 3, the legislature may provide for
the furnishing of transportation by the
state or local governments for children
to and from any school, whether public,
parochial or non-parochial private.
With reference to the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States appear to recognize a lim-

12
ited power in Congress or a state legislature
to accomplish a public purpose through
support of at least some non-sectarian activities of church-related schools.
In
1899, in Bradfield v. Roberts,19 4 the Supreme Court upheld a Congressional appropriation to erect a hospital building for
an order of Roman Catholic nuns. The
Court thus approved a direct appropriation, for the performance of the public
function of caring for the sick poor, to an
institution conducted under the auspices
of a church which exercised, in the Court's
phrase, "perhaps controlling influence"
over it.
In 1930 in Cochran v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Educ.,1 9 the Court held it constitutional for Louisiana to provide secular
textbooks for parochial school children.
The decision indicates that the teaching
of secular subjects in parochial schools is
the performance of a public function
and that it may, therefore, be governmentally aided. However, as we discussed
above, the Cochran decision antedated
the total application to the states, through
the fourteenth amendment, of the requirements of the first amendment.
The
Cochran ruling, therefore, is persuasive in
its reasoning but hardly conclusive on the
first amendment question today.
In Everson v. Board of Educ.,196 the
Court held that a New Jersey statute providing for reimbursement of bus transportation costs by the state to parents of
children attending parochial schools was
constitutional. The reimbursement unde-

194 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
195 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
106330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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niably made it easier for the parents to
send their children to the church-related
schools and, therefore, it conferred a
definite though unmeasurable benefit upon
the religious institutions.
The actual
holding, then, reinforces the rule of Bradfield and Cochran that a financial benefit
may constitutionally be conferred upon a
religious body incidentally to the achievement of a public purpose. Mr. Justice
Black, however, speaking for the Court,
delivered unfortunately sweeping language
that was not necessary to the decision of
the case. He said in one place:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of
the first amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another.197
Unhappily, another passage of the
Black opinion in Everson is less frequently
quoted:
On the other hand, other language of the
amendment commands that New Jersey
cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently,
it cannot exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews,
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians,
or the members of any other faith, be.
cause of their faith, or the lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.198
This principle is compelling in its
fairness and it could serve to validate certain forms of state aid to parochial schools
or to parochial school pupils. It is significant that the Supreme Court reaf-

Id. at 15.
198 Id. at 16.
197
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firmed this principle, and quoted this very
language from the Everson case, in a decision it rendered on the same day as the
1963 school prayer decision. The case
' 9 in which a
was Sherbert v. Verner,1
Seventh Day Adventist sought unemployment compensation under the South Carolina law. Pursuant to her faith, however, she refused to accept any job which
would require her work on Saturdays.
The state officials found that this was a
failure "without good cause . . . to accept
available suitable work," 200 and, therefore,
that she was ineligible for benefits. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Brennan, held that this was an
invalid infringement upon the petitioner's
free exercise of religion, in that the state
denied her the benefits of public welfare
legislation because she followed a dictate
of her faith. It could readily follow that
parochial school children could not be
denied inclusion in public educational assistance programs because their faith impelled them to attend religious schools.
Thus, it could be argued not only that the
inclusion of such pupils in such a program
would be constitutional, but also that their
exclusion would violate their free exercise of religion.
The extension to parochial schools and
their pupils of various public aids to the
teaching of secular subjects could confer
an incidental benefit upon the religious
schools attended by the benefited pupils.
This, however, would not of itself render
that extension invalid under the United
States Constitution. This conclusion is

reinforced by the decisions in which the
Supreme Court in 1961 upheld various
Sunday closing laws, although they conferred a benefit upon churches by making
worshippers more readily available on
Sundays, because the laws were "temporal
statutes" with a valid secular public pur201
pose.
If we apply the public purpose criterion
of Bradfield (1899), Cochran (1930),
Everson (1947) and McGowan (1961),
we can find justification for various governmental aids to parochial schools and
their pupils.
One case in which the
Supreme Court sought to create a climate
of hospitality between government and religion was Zorach v. Clauson,20 2 the 1952
case which upheld the New York released time program. Four years earlier,
in McCollum v. Board of Educ.,20° the
Court had nullified an Illinois released
time plan where the religious instruction
of the students was held on public school
property. In the New York plan approved in Zorach, the instruction was
held off the public school premises, but
the favorable decision may also have been
based upon the absence of the compulsion
which the Court found inherent in the
McCollum situation. More importantly,
Mr. Justice Douglas, for the Court in
Zorach, sanctioned at least some forms
of government cooperation with churches
and religion. Then in 1963 the Court attempted to define the requirements of the
public purpose doctrine:

201 McGowan
(1961).
199 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
200 Id. at 401.

v.

Maryland,

202 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
203 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

366
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The test may be stated as follows: what are
the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement
or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
20 1
advances nor inhibits religion.
The Supreme Court in this quotation
did not really articulate a new criterion
but rather gave to the public purpose test
a new formulation, the limits of which
have not yet been marked by the courts.
One recent decision, however, is very im.
portant as an indicator of a possible
future course of decision on this point.
On June 2, 1966, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, the highest court of that state,
ruled unconstitutional, in a four-to-three
decision, grants by the state legislature to
three church-related colleges.2 15 The court
upheld, however, a similar grant to a
fourth college.
The Maryland court in this decision,
described herein as the Horace Mann
case, ruled that the purpose of a legislative
grant could be demonstrated from the effect of the grant. The court also bore
down heavily on the need for an evaluation of the circumstances of each particular case. And the court gave its approval, again in reliance on the Schempp
decision, to the further test that, if a
statute furthers both secular and religious
ends, it may be invalid if the state could

201
20

Supra note 193, at 222.
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reasonably have attained the secular end
by means which do not further the promotion of religion:
A state cannot pass a law to aid one
religion or all religions, but state action
to promote the general welfare of society,
apart from any religious considerations is
valid, even though religious interests may
be indirectly benefited. If the primary
purpose of the state action is to promote
religion, that action is in violation of the
Amendment, but if a statute furthers
both secular and religious ends, an examination of the means used is necessary to
determine whether the state could reasonably have attained the secular end by
means which do not further the promo20 6
tion of religion.
The Maryland court in the Horace
Mann case distinguished the direct grants
involved there from the bus transportation involved in the Everson case:
It must be remembered that here involved are direct grants of tax-raised funds
to the educational institutions, themselves,
which will become the sole owners of the
buildings if erected. If appellees' contention that there is nothing in the Establishment Clause which proscribes direct
grants to aid and support sectarian educational institutions were correct, it seems
that Everson, supra, would have been decided quite easily and without dissent,
even though no direct grant was there involved. The funds here involved are entirely different from those in such cases
as Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md.
314, and

Everson, supra.

In Everson,

the Supreme Court ruled that a State
could constitutionally finance bus transportation of children to parochial as well
as public schools, on the ground that involved was 'public welfare legislation' (protecting all children from traffic hazards

of Pub.
206
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and dangers), and under the provisions
of the first amendment no State could exclude individuals, because of their faith,

from receiving the benefits of such legislation. In Wheat, this Court ruled constitutional a statute which required the
Board of Education (under limitations as
to distance, etc.) to carry parochial students to and from their schools upon
the same conditions that public-school
children were carried, on the ground that
the statute protected the safety of the
children while en route to and from
schools. No direct grants of money or
property to any educational institution
were involved in either case, but the Supreme Court split 5 to 4 and this Court
4 to 3 on the issues, with vigorous dis201
sents being filed in each case.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of
the Horace Mann decision is its adoption
of the method of case-by-case evaluation,
in extensive detail, to determine whether a
particular grant improperly aids religion.
One grant was to Hood College for the
construction of a dormitory and classroom
building. Hood is a liberal arts college
for women and is loosely affiliated with
the United Church of Christ. It has, however, a religiously heterogeneous faculty,
administration and student body. There
is no religious indoctrination of the students and no religious activities will be
conducted in the buildings to be erected
with the aid of the grant. The college
permits outside groups, without regard to
church affiliation, to use its facilities during the summer. The United Church of
Christ does not control the administration
of the school and provides only 2.2%
of the operating budget of the school and

207

Id. at 72.

practically nothing in the way of capital
gifts. The court cited additional factors:
The only physical structure of a religious
character seems to be the Chapel, and it is
open to all. Religion in the curriculum
and in extra-curricular programs is at a
minimum for any church-related school.
We do not find that religion occupies a
dominant place in the College's program,
the record clearly showing that students
are not required to attend and participate
in many religious observances. It is, of
course, accredited. The record does not
disclose any great activity among the
alumnae of a religious nature, and, although the image of Hood in the community is that of a good, sound, and
efficient College, there is no showing that
it is considered to be religiously slanted.
Under the circumstances, it is obvious
that neither the U.C.C. nor any other
religion is runnings the institution, or has
control over it.20
The court concluded that Hood is sufficiently uncommitted to be ruled non-sectarian in a legal sense:
Applying the criteria we named above, we
are unable to say that the College is
sectarian in a legal sense under the First
Amendment, or to a degree that renders
the grant invalid thereunder. The college's stated purposes in relation to religion are not of a fervent, intense, or
passionate nature, but seem to be based
largely upon its historical background.209

Western Maryland College, however, a
recipient of a grant for the construction
of a science wing and a dining hall, is
controlled and supported by the Methodist
Church. The Church contributes financial
support of considerable value, "both oper-

208 Id. at 67-68.
209 d.at 67.

12
ational and capital." 210 The college faculty is designedly Christian and a significant number of students are Methodist
preministerial students. The children of
Methodist ministers are charged only half
tuition. The facilities of the campus are
made available at cost, to Methodist organizations. The administration and faculty are predominantly Methodist. Students are frankly indoctrinated with religion and all students must attend Protestant religious services. "The image of the
college in the community is strongly Methodist.

' 21

I

The court ruled that the col-

lege "is sectarian in a legal sense under the
First Amendment" 212 and emphasized that
the effect of the grant would be to aid
religion:
We find nothing on the face of the bill
or its legislative history to demonstrate a
purpose to use the State's coercive power
to aid religion, but a careful consideration of all the facts impels us to the
conclusion that the operative effect will be
such, if the grant be effectuated. As
stated in footnote 14, 'the most effective
way to establish any institution is to
finance it. Financing a church either in
its strictly religious activities or in its
other activities is equally unconstitutional.' 212
The last quoted sentence was
from the concurring opinion of Mr.
Douglas, of the Supreme Court
United States, in the 1962 school

taken
Justice
of the
prayer

case, Engle v. Vitale,214 which the Horace

Mann court had already quoted in a prior

2101d. at 68.
211 Id. at 69.
212

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

1966

footnote. The last quoted sentence does
not appear to be consistent with a broadlyconstrued public purpose doctrine.
Notre Dame College and St. Joseph
College, two Roman Catholic colleges conducted and controlled by an order of nuns,
were also held to be too sectarian to receive the state grants. In both cases
the administration and faculty are predominantly and designedly Catholic priests
or nuns. Both student bodies include
candidates for religious orders and both
are practically entirely Catholic. Both receive heavy financial assistance from the
controlling religious orders. In each college, Catholicity pervades the entire program and students are indoctrinated and
encouraged in their religion. The campuses are made available for use only by
outside groups which are Catholic. The
image of each college in the community is
strongly Catholic. At Notre Dame, if the
grant were to be approved, "each class in
the new science building will open with a
prayer";21 the projected science building
at St. Joseph would house "crucifixes,
'maybe' statues and 'very likely' waterfo n ts . . . . , 216
The court ruled flatly that the operative
effect of the grants to such sectarian
schools demonstrates a purpose on the
part of the legislature to use the state's
coercive power to aid religion:
Again, we find nothing on the faces of the
two Bills or in their legislative histories to
demonstrate a purpose to use the State's
coercive power to aid religion, but a consideration of the totality of attendant circumstances impels a conclusion that their

Ibid.

213 Ibid.
214370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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operative effect (if the grants be ef217
fectuated) demonstrates such a purpose.
The grants, therefore, were invalidated.
The Horace Mann court then went on to
rule that the grants which it had voided
as contrary to the first amendment did not
violate the constitution of the State of
Maryland. Vermont and Maryland, incidentally, are the only two states which
do not have explicit prohibitions in their
constitutions against the appropriation of
public money to schools controlled by religious organizations.218 The effect of the
court's ruling that the grants do not
violate the Maryland Constitution is to
frame the first amendment issue clearly for
the Supreme Court of the United States.
If the latter court were to rule on the
merits of the Horace Mann case on appeal, it would have to deal directly with
the first amendment question. For, according to the normal canons of judicial
review, the Maryland court's opinion on
the question of the state constitution would
seem to preclude the Supreme Court from
avoiding the first amendment issue by ruling, contrary to the highest court of Maryland, that the grants violated the Maryland Constitution.
The dissenting opinion by three of the
seven justices of the Maryland court in
the Horace Mann case emphasized the
public purpose performed by churchrelated colleges in providing education in
secular fields. And it noted that, at the
present time, such private colleges could
not continue to perform this public function without public assistance. The ben-

efit to religion, argued the dissenters, is
incidental and there is no alternative way
in which the state could promote the
secular educational activities of such colleges without the conferral of such an incidental benefit upon religion. The dissenters also argued that the grants followed a practice established over one
hundred eighty years, an argument which
the court's majority had found not controlling on the constitutional question.
This recent Maryland case has been recounted here in some detail merely because it may foreshadow a new and more
restrictive interpretation by the Supreme
Court of the public purpose doctrine.
However, it should be emphasized that the
reasoning of the Maryland case has not
yet been upheld by the Supreme Court
and that the current state of constitutional
interpretation by the highest Court does
not at all preclude a more hospitable interpretation of the first amendment than
we see in the Horace Mann case.
Perhaps the most important effect of
the Horace Mann decision at this time
should be an awakening to the difficulty
and indeed the likely impossibility of
achieving direct, substantial governmental
grants to church-related schools without a
substantial sacrifice by those schools of
their independence and sectarian character. For it is quite clear that the recipients of substantial governmental subsidies can be bound by constitutional restrictions incumbent upon the subsidizing
government. 219 It is fairly predictable,

See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Simkins, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
219

Ibid.
218 Id. at 76.
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12
moreover, that church-related schools receiving general government subsidies will
ultimately be forbidden, for example, to
give preference to parishioners in their admission policies and will ultimately be
bound by at least some of the secularizing mandates which have followed upon
the Supreme Court's public school prayer
decisions. These considerations are relevant here insofar as they incline us to consider soberly the long-term results of subsidies which are attractive in the short
run, and insofar as they lead us to consider more seriously the devices of parental tax credits and deductions for tuition
which can indirectly but really alleviate
the financial problems of private schools
without entailing the pervasive governmental controls which inevitably accompany direct public subsidies. Such controls are absent under a tax credit or deduction program because when a parent
is given a tax credit for tuition paid to a
private school and the school raises its
tuition correspondingly, the increased
money which the school receives from
the parent has never been government
money. And the tax credit could be supplemented by a direct "G.I. Bill" type
tuition grant to those parents who have insufficient income to benefit from a tax
credit. The entire tax problem, of course,
is the subject of another study and is
mentioned here only to show its relation
to and effect upon the problems posed
by Article XI, Section 3 of the New York
Constitution.
Two other Supreme Court decisions are
important here in assessing the interrelations among the first amendment, private
schools and parents. In Meyer v. Ne-
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braska,22 0 the Court held that a state law
forbidding the teaching in any elementary
school of any other than the English
language was unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference with the natural
right and duty of parents to give their
children a suitable education, in this case
a training in a foreign language. In Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,2 2 1 in 1925, the Court
held that an Oregon statute requiring all
children to attend public schools was unconstitutional as a violation of the right
of private schools to exist and "the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children un-

der their control."

222

The statute also

violated the right of the children themselves to attend private schools. The
Meyer and Pierce cases recognize the
rights of parents and children to resort
to private schools and the right of those
schools to exist. These are rights which
the government may not abolish or unThese prior rights
reasonably curtail.
assume great importance in view of the
prospect that a prolonged continuation of
the current exclusion of parochial school
pupils from the benefits available now
to public school pupils may drive many
of these parochial schools out of coinpetition and into extinction. A continued
denial of educational benefits to parochial
school children may consequently interfere in practice with the basic freedom of
educational choice.
But whatever the problems which arise
under the first amendment, a more dif-

220262 U.S. 390 (1923).
221 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
222

d.

at 534-35.
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ficult issue is posed by the New York State
Constitution. The provisions of Article
XI, Section 3, are much more explicit and
restrictive than those of the first amendment. And it is argued that, when the
1938 Convention affirmatively allowed
only transportation aid to church-related
schools, all other forms of aid were implicitly excluded.
However, the con,clusion that the explicit sanction in 1938
of transportation had foreclosed other
types of aid is deceptive in its simplicity.
For we are not concerned merely with the
law of 1938, but rather with that of
1966. Article XI, Section 3, must be
viewed in the light of the developments of
the quarter-century just concluded. In
that period, there has been a significant
relaxation of the rigors of section 3 by
the New York courts. For example, in
.64th Street Residences, Inc. v. City of
New York, 223 the Court of Appeals held

that Fordham University had received
neither direct nor indirect aid, within the
meaning of the constitutional prohibition,
from its acquisition of Lincoln Square
property at a reduced cost through a statefinanced urban renewal program. The
Court of Appeals in the 64th Street Residences case denied that the arrangement
was a gift or subsidy at all and in so
doing the Court, to say the least, was far
less preoccupied than was the Judd Court
with the fact that Article XI, Section 3
prohibits indirect as well as direct aid:
Plaintiffs say that the condemnation of
this land and the sale thereof to the
university is completely void because

2234 N.Y.2d 268, 150 N.E.2d 396, 174 N.Y.S.2d
1, cert. denied, Harris v. City of New York, 357
U.S. 907 (1958).

Fordham is a denominational school and
the sale to it, according to plaintiffs, at
$7 per square foot of land for which
the city will pay an estimated cost of
about $16 per square foot would thus be
an unconstitutional grant or subsidy of
public moneys to a religious corporation.
The argument, however, proceeds on an
assumption false in fact. Plaintiffs say that
because the city arranged to sell this land
at a price much below what the city will
pay for it, this necessarily amounts to
a subsidy or gift. But what the city is
buying is not the same as what Fordham
is buying. The city buys land and buildings. Fordham buys the same property but
subject to its agreement to raze the buildings, relocate the tenants and use the
cleared land for a collegiate campus and
buildings only. What Fordham is paying for is the re-use value of the land.
There is in this record no dispute of the
fact, found by both courts below, that the
$7 per square foot which Fordham agreed
to bid, and did, is at least equal to the
re-use value as established by several appraisals, all of which reported figures lower
than $7 per square foot. Therefore,
there is no substance to the assertion, on
which this whole suit depends, that Fordham is getting a gift, grant or subsidy
of public property. It is, of course, getting a benefit in the sense that it is being
permitted to acquire valuable and desirable property at a price which is probably
lower than it would have to pay if it had
to negotiate with all the private owners,
but the private owners are getting from
the city the full value of the property
in its present condition and use. The city
benefits by the achievements of its valid
municipal purpose of eliminating a slum.
The State and Federal statutes contemplate
that the purchaser from the city will pay
less than the city pays since it will always
be the case that the city is buying land

12
and buildings and selling either cleared
land or land which the purchaser must
agree to clear and use for restricted purposes.

2 24

Also, the Court noted that it
have been a violation of Fordham
versity's rights if that school had
barred from the bidding on account

might
Unibeen
of its

religious status:
Any collegiate institution could have been
a bidder at the auction. Special Term
pointed out, probably correctly, that Fordham would be deprived of constitutional
rights if it alone were excluded from the
bidding. Perhaps this is only another
way of saying that, since this sale is an
exchange of considerations and not a
gift or subsidy, no 'aid to religion' is involved and a religious corporation cannot
222
be excluded from bidding.
It is this remark by the Court of Appeals which leads into the most significant
developments in this area since 1938. For
one thing, there is the general recognition
by the Supreme Court, as seen in Everson
and Sherbert, that the paramount command of the first amendment forbids the
exclusion of persons, because of their religion, from the reception of a public benefit for which they would otherwise be
eligible. Also, the first amendment now
clearly permits the attainment of a public
purpose through some forms of aid to
pupils attending church-related schools. 226
When these developments are coupled
with the growing tendency to recognize
that aid to the pupils is not necessarily,
224

Id. at 275-76,

150 N.E.2d at 398-99,
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N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
225 Id. at 276, 150 N.E.2d at 399, 174 N.Y.S.2d
at 5.
220Everson

(1947).

v.

Board

of Educ., 330 U.S.

1

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

AUTUMN

1966

even indirectly, aid to the institutions he attends, 227 it may be fairly concluded that Article XI, Section 3 would not warrant today
the inflexible approach taken in the 1938
Judd transportation case. Indeed, there is
reason to suspect that even the Judd case
might be decided differently today in light
of the intervening decision of the Everson
case in 1947, in which the Supreme Court
specifically upheld for the first time, under
the first amendment, the provisions of the
sort of transportation involved in Judd.2 '
In summary, it is fair to say that to
regard the rule of the Judd case as retaining its original vitality would be to
lend undue credence to an erroneous construction of the 1938 amendment to Section 3 of Article XI of the New York

227 Ibid. Swart v. South Burlington Town
School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514, cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961), is not to the
contrary since there the Supreme Court of Vermont invalidated a program of tuition payments
by a school board where the payments were
made directly to the schools. See also Scales
v. Board of Educ., 41 Misc. 2d 391, 245 N.Y.S.
2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1963), upholding the provision
by a board of education of home tutoring services to a physically handicapped parochial school
pupil who was temporarily prevented by her
illness from attending the parochial school.
228 See discussion in Note, 30 FORDHAM L. REV.
503, 508 (1962). In Matthews v. Quinton, 362
P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
517 (1962), the Supreme Court of Alaska invalidated a statute providing free bus transportation for all pupils, including those attending
parochial schools. In Dickman v. School Dist.,
232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962), the Oregon Supreme Court struck down a statute providing
free secular textbooks for parochial school
children. Both cases were decided under the
Alaska and Oregon state constitutional provisions and both relied, erroneously, on the
Judd case.
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State Constitution. For, although that
amendment provided only for transportation of pupils, it should be construed in
its true light as a reaction to the Judd
decision which called it forth. As such
it specifically validated only the provision
of transportation which the legislature had
enacted in 1936 and which the Judd Court
had nullified. But it ought not to be regarded as a considered and sweeping condemnation of all other forms of public aid to
those pupils who choose to attend parochial schools. The newer and fundamental developments since 1938 affirm the
basic constitutionality and indeed the fairness, of achieving a public purpose through
secular aid to all pupils, including those
attending parochial schools.
It would be a mistake, however, to
regard the generally more lenient trend
of judicial decisions as having removed all
need for the removal of Article XI, Section 3, from the New York State Constitution. The enduring vitality of this
Blaine Amendment as a threat to efforts
to accommodate the interests of government and religion was dramatized by the
decision

in Board of Educ. v.

Allen,2' 2 9

in which the supreme court in Albany
County invalidated an amendment to the
Education Law which empowered local
school boards to lend secular textbooks

attending
church-related
to children
schools. The court unnecessarily discoursed upon the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and construed
the first amendment, in line with the views
of Mr. Justice Douglas of the United
States Supreme Court, as prohibiting the
sort of financial aid to parochial schools
which was involved in the textbook loans.
The excursion into the first amendment
was unnecessary because the court bottomed its decision upon Article XI, Section 3 of the New York Constitution and
rejected the "pupil benefit theory" in so
doing, in reliance upon the 1938 case of
Judd v. Board of Educ.2 - and the 1922
case of Smith v. Donahue.2 31

The court

in the Allen case regarded the extreme
position of the Judd case as retaining its
full effect, save for the transportation
exception adopted by the Convention of
1938, despite the events and trends of the
past twenty-eight years as outlined above
in this study. It may be that the Allen
ruling will be overturned on appeal. But,
in any event, the main effect of the Allen
case may prove to be its dramatization of
the need for a total elimination of the
Blaine Amendment, an unfair embodiment of restrictive conceptions long since
rejected by the majority of the people of
this state and nation.

230278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
22951

Misc. 2d 297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup.

Ct. 1966).

21

202 App. Div. 656,

(1922).
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